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1. Introduction 
1.1.Background 
Dangerous goods carried by sea may pose a great threat to the carrying ship, cargo onboard, 
people and the environment, especially if the goods are not handled correctly. The conse-
quences of dangerous cargo being shipped without the carrier being aware of its special na-
ture may prove fatal. The dangerous cargo may be handled or stowed incorrectly by the crew 
which may, in the worst case, result in the sinking of the carrying vessel.  
The views on how the liability shall be apportioned between the parties involved in the mar-
itime venture has varied over time and between jurisdictions. The general approach today 
however seems to be that the contracting shipper is in the best position to know the charac-
teristics of the cargo and the necessary precautions that need to be taken to ensure a safe 
carriage. An extensive liability has therefore been imposed on the contracting shipper of 
dangerous goods in Finland and other jurisdictions.  
1.2.Identification of a legal problem 
In Finnish law, the allocation of obligations and liability between the contracting shipper1 of 
the cargo and the carrier2 in maritime carriage of dangerous goods is regulated in Chapter 
13 of the Maritime Code (FMC). The carrier’s cargo liability is set out in Sections 24 to 39 
of the chapter. Section 7 sets out the contracting shipper’s specific obligations when shipping 
dangerous goods; he is obliged to notify the contracting and receiving carriers in due time 
of the dangerous nature of the goods and of necessary safety precautions. Furthermore, the 
goods shall be suitably marked as dangerous. Pursuant to 13:41 the contracting shipper is 
liable regardless of fault for damage caused by dangerous goods, where he has delivered the 
goods to a carrier without informing him according to Section 7 of the dangerous properties 
and necessary safety measures and where the carrier is not otherwise aware of their danger-
ous properties.  
The provision contained in Section 41 raises questions on the applicability of the contracting 
shipper’s strict liability rule under Finnish law. The construction of the strict liability rule 
implies that the contracting shipper is liable irrespective of whether he was familiar with the 
                                                          
1 The term “contracting shipper” here refers to the “sender” pursuant to Chapter 13 of the FMC. As per the 
definition in FMC 13:1 the contracting shipper (sender) is the person who enters into a contract of carriage of 
general cargo with the carrier.  
2 As per the definition in FMC 13:1 the carrier is the person who enters into a contract of carriage of general 
cargo with the contracting shipper (sender).  
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dangerous characteristics of the cargo or not. He thus bears the risk of having misjudged the 
nature of the goods, and of not having any information whatsoever on the potential danger-
ousness of the goods. In such a situation, the contracting shipper can only escape strict lia-
bility where the carrier is otherwise aware of the dangerous characteristics of the goods. 
Where the strict liability rule is not inactivated, the fault-based liability in respect of ordinary 
goods, as contained in FMC 13:40, may be applied.3  In order to understand the applicability 
of the strict liability rule, the following issues thus needs to be considered: 
a) What cargo is considered “dangerous”? 
b) What kind of information is the contracting shipper required to provide to the carrier 
to make him aware of the dangerous nature and the required safety precautions?  
c) When is the carrier considered being “otherwise” aware of the dangerous nature? 
The knowledge of the parties appears to play a prominent role in determining the applicabil-
ity of the strict liability rule, at least where one is to answer the second and third questions 
above. The contracting shipper cannot inform of anything he is not aware of, and to escape 
strict liability, he will then have to prove that the carrier was otherwise aware of the danger-
ous nature of the goods. Interestingly, the leading English legal scholar Michael Mustill has 
argued that the carrier’s knowledge of the nature of the cargo will also have implications on 
the assessment of whether the cargo is dangerous or not.4 In Mustill’s reasoning, any cargo 
may entail danger if not handled correctly due to the carrier’s ignorance of its special re-
quirements. As this study will show, the notion of “dangerous goods” is more narrowly de-
fined in Nordic law and is primarily focused on the inherent dangerous properties of the 
goods. Mustill’s reasoning however shows the importance of ensuring a proper exchange of 
information between the contracting shipper and the carrier to minimize the risks during 
carriage, which must be considered the core purpose of the strict liability rule.  
The contracting shipper’s strict liability has been justified by asserting that that the contract-
ing shipper has the best possibilities of controlling the characteristics of the cargo and thus 
to prevent damage caused by dangerous goods.5 This is true where the contracting shipper 
has an actual chance of detecting the potential dangerous properties of the goods when 
                                                          
3 Hannu Honka, ‘New Carriage of Goods by Sea - The Nordic Approach’ in Hannu Honka (ed), New car-
riage of goods by sea: The Nordic approach including comparisions with some other jurisdictions (Institute 
of Martime and Commercial Law 1997), 157. 
4 Michael J Mustill, ‘Carrier's Liabilities and Insurance’ in Kurt Grönfors (ed), Damage from Goods (Skrif-
ter/ Sjörättsföreningen i Göteborg vol 58. Akademiförlaget 1978), 76. 
5 Cf. inter alia ND 1941.353 Else (DCC), 362.  
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making proper investigations of the nature and requirements of the goods. However, there 
are certain types of goods that exhibit dangerous characteristics under very special condi-
tions, such as under the strains of a sea carriage in hard weather. These characteristics may 
not be generally known. Furthermore, new substances may possess properties that no one is 
yet aware of.  
The strict liability rule is therefore brought to a head in situations where neither the contract-
ing shipper nor the carrier knew, or ought to have known, the goods were dangerous. A 
crucial issue is how the risk for damage caused by the dangerous goods shall be distributed 
in such a case. Under the current liability model, the risk is placed on the contracting shipper. 
It goes without saying that it is impossible for the contracting shipper to fulfill his obligation 
to inform, and prevent damage from occurring, when he was not ought to be aware of the 
dangerous characteristics. His only way out of strict liability is then if the carrier was other-
wise aware of the nature of the goods. As this study will show, under current Nordic law, 
the contracting shipper will be strictly liable even where he had no means of knowing the 
dangerous properties of the cargo, but the carrier was in a better position of observing the 
dangerous properties of the goods. It thus does not appear to strike a fair balance between 
the interests of the contracting shipper and the carrier.  
1.3.Purpose and scope of the study 
The purpose of this thesis it to investigate the applicability of the contracting shipper’s strict 
liability for damage caused by dangerous goods from a de lege lata and de lege ferenda point 
of view. The strict liability of the contracting shipper under FMC is the starting point for this 
study. However, as the Nordic Maritime Codes (NMC) are to a considerable extent similar, 
there is no reason not to expand the scope of the study to cover the law of the Nordic coun-
tries in general. In this context, the “Nordic countries” refers to Finland, Sweden, Denmark 
and Norway. The reason for this definition is that these countries had an extensive coopera-
tion when drafting their new maritime codes in the 1980’s and 1990’s.6  
The core research question may thus be expressed in the following way: Is the current con-
struction of the contracting shipper’s strict liability under the NMC appropriate? As have 
been concluded when identifying the legal issues connected to the contracting shipper’s strict 
liability, there are three main parameters that affect the applicability of the strict liability 
rule. These must be analyzed separately to be able to draw any conclusions as to when the 
                                                          
6 Honka, ‘New Carriage of Goods by Sea - The Nordic Approach’ (n 3), 16 f. 
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strict liability comes into play, and furthermore to consider whether the current liability 
model is appropriate.  
The first parameter is the determination of what goods shall be considered “dangerous” for 
the purpose of the strict liability. The NMC contain no definition of “dangerous goods”. The 
Finnish Government Bill on a Maritime Code (Finnish Bill) provides some guidelines7, how-
ever, much discretion is left to the courts to decide on the dangerousness of a particular 
cargo. 
The second parameter is the information the contracting shipper is obliged to give to the 
carrier in order to fulfill his obligation to inform under FMC 13:7 and thus be relieved of his 
strict liability under 13:41.  
Under the third parameter the question rather is where the threshold is set as to when the 
carrier shall be considered being “otherwise” aware of the dangerous characteristics of the 
cargo. Is the strict liability inactivated already where the carrier is ought to be aware of the 
danger? And what relevance do the carrier’s general duty of care in respect of carried goods 
have in this context? The second and third parameters are very much interrelated, as both 
require that the carrier shall in one way or another have become aware of the dangerous 
nature of the goods.  
It appears to be a range of considerations to make to determine whether the contracting ship-
per’s liability for dangerous goods should be strict or fault-based. The first step of this thesis 
is to undertake an extensive analysis of the current state of Nordic law with regards to these 
issues. The analysis will reveal shortcomings in the current liability construction. After hav-
ing drawn conclusions as to the applicability of the strict liability rule, a more critical ap-
proach to the topic will be appropriate to answer the question whether the basis and scope of 
the contracting shipper’s liability for damage caused by dangerous goods are still justified. 
This critical scrutiny will take as its starting point the established shortcomings of the con-
struction, general theories on strict liability and alternative ways of constructing, or constru-
ing, the dangerous goods liability. The main focus will be on finding an appropriate balance 
between the interests of the contracting shipper and the carrier. In sub-chapter 6.7.4. some 
considerations will also be made to other interests, given the extensive damage that the car-
riage of dangerous goods may cause to persons, property and environment. It must however 
                                                          
7 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland), 35.  
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be kept in mind that the strict liability rule as contained in NMC 13:41 is aimed at regulating 
the internal distribution of risks between the contracting shipper and the carrier(s). The con-
struction of the strict liability rule will only have a limited impact on the channeling of lia-
bility for damage caused by dangerous goods in general. However, an effective liability con-
struction under NMC 13:41 will promote the prevention of losses caused by dangerous 
goods, which will be of public interest.  
1.4.Delimitations 
There is a large quantity of international legal literature on the theme of carriage of danger-
ous goods, covering a variety of perspectives and viewpoints. As the title of the thesis already 
suggests, some extensive delimitations have been made to the scope of the study. The objec-
tive of the thesis is restricted to investigating the contracting shipper’s strict liability for 
damage caused by dangerous goods during sea carriage. This excludes carriage by other 
modes of transport. The strict liability is set out in Chapter 13 of the NMC, which as a start-
ing point applies to carriage of general cargo only. The chapter may under certain circum-
stances apply also to the relationship between the parties to a charterparty. However, the 
rules on dangerous goods as contained in Chapter 13 will never come into play in char-
terparty relations. This is due to the fact that Chapter 13 explicitly excludes charterparties 
from its scope of application. Only where a bill of lading has been issued pursuant to a char-
terparty will the provisions of Chapter 13 apply mandatorily to the relationship between the 
carrier and a third-party holder of the bill.8 As the contracting shipper is defined as the car-
rier’s contractual party9, the contracting shipper can never be a third-party holder of the bill.  
Another reason for excluding charterparty relations from the scope of this thesis is that strict 
liability in respect of damage caused by dangerous goods is an unknown concept in char-
terparty relations. Charterparties are governed by Chapter 14 in the NMC. The only provi-
sion in Chapter 14 specifically touching on the transport of dangerous goods is 14:22, setting 
out the voyage charterparty carrier’s rights of disposing of dangerous goods. The liability of 
the (voyage) charterer when shipping dangerous goods must be decided on the basis of NMC 
14:37 which sets out a general fault-based liability for “damage caused by the goods”.  
Furthermore, this study is confined to the contracting shipper’s liability to the carrier.  The 
contracting shipper is by the definition in NMC 13:1 the contractual party to the carrier, 
                                                          
8 NMC 13:3 first paragraph second sentence.  
9 NMC 13:1.  
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meaning that the liability may be considered a contractual one. However, as will be shown, 
the contracting shipper is not only liable to the contractual carrier under NMC 13:41 but also 
to a sub-carrier, i.e. a carrier who is contracted by the contracting carrier to perform the 
carriage or part of it10. It is not fully clear to what extent the liability towards a sub-carrier is 
considered falling within the contract, but under Nordic law a contract will generally be 
considered established with the contracting shipper where an actual carrier physically takes 
the goods in his charge.11 This must mean that the contracting shipper’s liability both to the 
contracting carrier and to the sub-carriers performing part of the carriage will be contractual. 
As NMC 13:41 regulates the contracting shipper’s liability to the carrier(s), his liability to-
wards third parties will not be considered in this study. However, the contracting may be-
come indirectly liable for damage caused to third parties by way of the carrier’s recourse 
actions pursuant to NMC 13:41. These may relate to damage caused to the goods of other 
cargo owners, other property onboard or outside the ship or human injuries or death. The 
registered shipowner is subject to a strict liability to third-parties under several international 
conventions, such as the Civil Liability Convention (CLC)12, Bunker Convention13 (BC) and 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances Convention (HNSC)14.  
NMC 13:41 gives the carrier the right to dispose of dangerous goods where the contracting 
shipper has not informed of their dangerous nature in due time. The carrier is then entitled 
to unload, render innocuous or destroy the goods without any liability to compensate the 
contracting shipper for the damage caused. As this provision is not directly relevant to the 
discussion on the applicability of the contracting shipper’s strict liability, it will not be taken 
into further account in this thesis.   
1.5.Method and materials 
In order to determine the current state of Nordic law, it is necessary to interpret and system-
atize the applicable law. However, the study of the contracting shipper’s strict liability is 
                                                          
10 Cf. definition of sub-carrier in NMC 13:1.  
11 Honka, ‘New Carriage of Goods by Sea - The Nordic Approach’ (n 3), 152. For further discussions on the 
relationship between the contracting shipper and an actual carrier, cf. Hannu Honka, ‘New Carriage of Goods 
by Sea - The Nordic Approach’ in Hannu Honka (ed), New carriage of goods by sea: The Nordic approach 
including comparisions with some other jurisdictions (Institute of Martime and Commercial Law 1997), 76.  
12 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1992 
13 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001 
14 International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea 1996 
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also aimed at questioning the appropriateness of the current liability construction. The 
method may thus be described as a critical legal dogmatic method.  
The starting point of the study is the (two) provisions on dangerous goods contained in the 
NMC Chapter 13. It will however also be necessary to take other parts of the NMC into 
account and to undertake some systematization of applicable law provisions to determine 
the applicability of the strict liability rule. The carrier’s general carriage obligations will 
require consideration to strike a balance between the respective obligations and liabilities of 
the parties to the contract of carriage. To at all be able to structure the law on the topic in a 
logical way, the first step will be to construe the meaning of the NMC provisions.  
In the interpretation of the relevant provisions in the NMC, the starting point will be the 
wording of the provisions, and the natural understanding of them. The preparatory works to 
the NMC will also be considered in order to trace the intention of the legislator. The previous 
Nordic maritime codes and their preparatory works will be studied to track the legislative 
development and obtain an understanding of the liability construction. The fact that the leg-
islator did not intend any material changes to the dangerous goods provisions in the 1994 
revision of the maritime codes15 further supports the study of the previous codes, their pre-
paratory materials and case law stemming from that time.  
The dangerous good provisions as contained in the NMC are founded on international con-
ventions on the carriage of goods by sea, primarily the Hague Rules (HR)16 and Hague-Visby 
Rules17 (HVR). However, when the NMC were amended in 1994, some specifications were 
made in accordance with the Hamburg Rules18, even though the Nordic countries have not 
ratified the convention.19 It was decided to adopt the parts of the Hamburg Rules which were 
not in direct conflict with the HVR.20 Consequently, it will be necessary to have a look at 
the dangerous goods provisions included in these conventions. However, this will be done 
only to the extent the wording of the NMC is ambiguous.  
                                                          
15 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 50.  
16 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading 1924 
17 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading, as Amended 
by the Protocol signed at Brussels on 23 February 1968 and the Protocol signed at Brussels on 21 December 
1979 
18 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, signed at Hamburg on 31 March 1978 
19 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 50.  
20 ibid, 17.  
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Relevant legal doctrine and case law will also be considered in the interpretation of the pro-
visions. The Nordic legal research on the topic is however sparse. The Nordic materials do 
not generally go into great depth on the contracting shipper’s obligations and liabilities in 
connection with the shipment of dangerous goods. The amount of relevant court decisions 
is also limited. Consequently, foreign doctrine and case law will be considered to the extent 
it may provide some guidance on the interpretation of the Nordic law. Such guidance may 
possibly be found in the court practice of other member states of the HR/HVR and/or the 
Hamburg Rules21. In the UK, there is extensive legal research and case law on the topic. The 
UK is party to the HVR, which have been implemented through the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act 1971 (UK COGSA).22 Given that the conventions aim at creating uniform rules on 
the carriage of goods by sea, some parallels will be drawn from the UK case law and doc-
trine. This will however be undertaken with great care and awareness of the differences be-
tween the legal systems. When it comes to the use of UK case law, it will be crucial to make 
a distinction between case law where statutory provisions, such as the UK COGSA, are ap-
plied on the one hand and common law on the other hand. Common law applies where noth-
ing has been specifically agreed between the parties to a contract and where no statues are 
applicable.23 Common law is created and developed through case law only. In the de lege 
lata discussion in this thesis, the consideration of UK case law will be restricted to cases 
where statutes are applicable. However, the common law approach to the contracting ship-
per’s liability for dangerous goods might provide interesting perspectives for the de lege 
ferenda discussion.  
In the de lege ferenda analysis of the applicability of the contracting shipper’s strict liability 
under Nordic law, comparations will also made to the UK approach and to the solution under 
the Rotterdam Rules (RR)24. The legal dogmatic method will thus contain comparative ele-
ments. It would be to go too far to assert that a comparative method is to be used in addition 
to the legal dogmatic method, as the purpose of the comparation is merely to support the de 
lege ferenda discussion. A full-scale legal comparation would require in-depth 
                                                          
21 Given the fact that the Hamburg Rules have primarily been ratified by developing countries, with legal 
systems that are not very similar to the Nordic systems, case law relating to Hamburg Rules is rare and not of 
great interest to this study.  
22 Jonathan Campbell and Kirsty MacHardy, ‘Carriage of goods by sea in the UK’ (2018) <www.lexol-
ogy.com> accessed 24 April 2019 
23 Stephen D Girvin, ‘Shipper's Liability for the Carriage of Dangerous Cargoes by Sea’ [1996] Lloyds Mari-
time and Commercial Law Quarterly 487, 487-488.  
24 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea 
2008. 
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considerations of the legal environment in which the rules of law exist.25 Such considerations 
are not possible to make within the scope of this thesis, but the distinct features of and dif-
ferences between the common law and continental legal systems will be kept in mind 
throughout the de lege ferenda discussion.  
Furthermore, also general theories on the functions of a strict liability will be considered 
when discussion the contracting shipper’s liability from a critical point of view. The discus-
sion will primarily focus on the economic preventive function of the strict liability, i.e. 
whether the application of a strict liability is the most efficient way to reduce the total costs 
for damage caused by dangerous goods. The thesis will thus to some extent include argu-
ments from a law and economics point of view.  
1.6.Disposition 
The introductory chapter has outlined the purpose and scope of the thesis and has made some 
important delimitations. Furthermore, it has reflected on the choice of research method and 
on the most relevant materials used.  
The substantive part of the thesis consists of two parts. Part I considers de lege lata the 
current state of Nordic law when it comes to the contracting shipper’s liability for damage 
caused by dangerous goods. In Part II a more critical de lege ferenda approach is taken in 
order to draw conclusions on whether the basis and scope of the contracting shipper’s liabil-
ity is justified. 
Part I is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the dangerous goods 
provisions primarily in the NMC, but also in the HVR and Hamburg Rules, as the relevant 
parts of the NMC are derived from those conventions.  
In chapter 3 the meaning of “dangerous” in this context is analyzed, in order to determine 
when the contracting shipper’s strict liability under is triggered under Nordic law.  
Chapter 4 aims at investigating the contracting shipper’s obligation to inform of the danger-
ous nature of the goods and the carrier’s knowledge of the dangerousness of goods. These 
issues are interrelated and can hardly be separated. In 4.1. considerations will also be made 
to some of the contracting shipper’s other obligations, which are of relevance to the fulfill-
ment of the obligation to inform and consequently the application of the strict liability. These 
are e.g. the duty to mark the goods as dangerous and to provide the carrier with information 
                                                          
25 Cf. Stig Strömholm, ‘Har den komparative rätten en metod?’ [1972] SvJT 456, 460-462. 
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on necessary precautionary measures. In sub-chapter 4.2. the aim is to draw conclusions on 
the degree of knowledge required by the carrier for the contracting shipper to be relieved of 
his strict liability. Furthermore, it will be specifically considered whether there are any 
grounds for asserting that the carrier shall be obliged to actively seek information on the 
nature of cargo.  
To summarize the de lege lata analysis of the Nordic state of law, the conclusions made in 
sub-chapters 4.2. and 4.3. will be balanced in Chapter 5 to determine the true allocation of 
risks between the parties. This will also serve as a bridge to Part II of the thesis, Chapters 6 
and 7, which aims at answering the question whether the current liability construction is 
appropriate. And if it is not considered appropriate, what would a better solution look like?  
Part I The dangerous goods liability of the contracting shipper – de lege lata 
2. The dangerous goods provisions in the NMC, HVR and Hamburg Rules 
2.1.The Nordic Maritime Codes 
2.1.1. An introduction to the NMC 
Nordic legislative cooperation in the field of maritime law is not a new phenomenon. The 
first manifest example of this was the Maritime Code introduced in Sweden-Finland in 
1667.26 During the 20th century, the HR and HVR were implemented into maritime codes in 
all Nordic countries. In the early 1980’s the work with preparing new legislation on the car-
riage of goods by sea was initiated by the governments in Finland, Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark. The maritime law committees in each country were instructed co-operate in the 
drafting of the new maritime codes.27 In this context, “Nordic” thus refers to the countries 
of Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. The current NMC entered into force in 1994.  
One underlying reason for the timing of the revision of the maritime codes was the entry into 
force of the Hamburg Rules in 1992. A crucial issue was whether the Nordic countries would 
give them effect or not.28 As have already been stated, the compromise found was that the 
Nordic countries implemented the parts of the Hamburg Rules which do not directly contra-
dict with the provisions of the HVR. In respect of the carriage of dangerous goods, the NMC 
                                                          
26 Honka, ‘New Carriage of Goods by Sea - The Nordic Approach’ (n 3), 16. 
27 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 14-15.  
28 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 15.  
  
11 
 
follow the Hamburg concept, which contains some specifications compared to the HVR. 
This was not considered to entail any contradictions.29 
The provisions in the maritime codes of Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark are identi-
cally worded, however the technical systems for numbering the provisions differ. Finland 
and Sweden use the same technical system, with each chapter divided into sections. In Nor-
way and Denmark the sections are numbered continuously, so that only the relevant sec-
tion(s) must be included when referring to the codes. In the discussion on the dangerous 
goods provisions in the NMC, reference will primarily be made to the sections in the FMC,  
and consequently also of the Swedish Maritime Code30 (SMC). However, the corresponding 
rule in the Norwegian Maritime Code31 (NoMC) and Danish Maritime Code32 (DMC) will 
be referred to in brackets.  
2.1.2. The contracting shipper’s legal position 
Pursuant to the ordinary liability rule as provided in NMC 13:40 (§ 290), the contracting 
shipper (in Swedish avsändare) is liable where damage is caused by the fault or negligence 
of the contracting shipper or someone who the contracting shipper is responsible for. How-
ever, where dangerous goods have been shipped without the carrier’s knowledge of the dan-
gerous characteristics of the goods, the contracting shipper’s liability towards the carrier and 
sub-carrier(s) is strict. As per the definition contained in NMC 13:1 (§ 251) the contracting 
shipper is the person entering into a contract of carriage with the carrier. The carrier is cor-
respondingly defined as the person entering into a contract of carriage with the contracting 
shipper. One thus need to examine the contract of carriage to identify the carrier and the 
contracting shipper respectively. Where the goods are shipped in connection with a sale, the 
delivery terms of the sales contract will determine whether it is the seller or buyer who is 
responsible for arranging and contracting for the carriage of the goods. The contracting ship-
per shall be distinguished from the shipper (in Swedish avlastare), which may be a separate 
person, who is not a party to the contract of carriage. The shipper is defined as the person 
who delivers the goods for carriage33. The shipper may be held liable by the carrier under 
the NMC 13:51 (§ 301) for incorrect information that has been entered on the bill of lading 
                                                          
29 Thomas Rhidian, ‘Special liability regimes under the international conventions for the carriage of goods by 
sea – dangerous cargo and deck cargo’ [2010] Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Handelsrecht 197, 198-199.  
30 Maritime Code 1994:1009 (Sweden)  
31 Maritime Code (Act no. 39 of 1994) 
32 Merchant Shipping Act (Act no. 170 of 1995) 
33 FMC 13:1 (§ 251) 
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on his request, but he has no obligation to notify the carrier of any potential dangerous char-
acteristics of the goods, and consequently no liability in this regard. The shipper’s role is 
therefore irrelevant for the further discussion.  
Distinction must also be made between the use of the term shipper under the NMC on one 
hand and under the laws of other jurisdictions and in international conventions on the other 
hand. Firstly, there are discrepancies between the English translations of the NMC. In the 
Finnish translation34 the term “avsändare”, i.e. the carrier’s contractual party, has been trans-
lated into “contracting shipper”, whereas the party delivering the goods for carriage is the 
“actual shipper”. In Denmark, the parties are named “shipper” and “consignor” respec-
tively. Norway and Sweden have adopted a uniform approach in naming the carrier’s con-
tracting party “sender” and the party delivering the goods “shipper”.  
Secondly, under the international conventions and in other jurisdictions, the dangerous goods 
liability is generally placed on the shoulders of the shipper. The HR and HVR contain no 
specific definition of “shipper”, but from the definition of “carrier” it is evident that the 
shipper shall must be considered the carrier’s contracting party. Under the Hamburg Rules, 
the shipper is defined as the carrier’s contracting party under the contract of carriage or the 
person who actually delivered the goods to the carrier. The Hamburg definition thus com-
prises both the “contracting shipper” and “shipper” pursuant to the FMC terminology. When 
these are not the same person, it must be assumed that they are jointly liable for failure to 
meet the obligations of the shipper under the Hamburg Rules. In the second Danish Com-
mittee Report on Carriage of Goods by Sea, the need to make a distinction between those 
persons in the NMC was enhanced.35 Under the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
1936 (US COGSA) and UK COGSA, being based on the HVR and HR, the shipper must be 
understood along the same lines as in the conventions.   
As this thesis will be discussing the dangerous goods liability from the perspectives of Nor-
dic, English and international law, it is necessary to establish a common use of terminology. 
As the starting point of the study is Nordic law in general and Finnish law in particular, I 
have chosen to adopt the Finnish approach to use the term “contracting shipper” for the party 
                                                          
34 Cf. the English translation of the FMC as contained in Hannu Honka (ed.), New carriage of goods by sea: 
The Nordic approach including comparisons with some other jurisdictions (Institute of Maritime and Commer-
cial Law 1997), Appendix 1. According to Honka the same translation is found in Publication L 37/95 of the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications in Finland. At the time of writing this thesis, the translation is 
however not available anymore. 
35 Committee Report 2 on Carriage of Goods by Sea, Denmark, ‘Betænkning nr. 1215 (2. Betænkning afgivet 
av sølovsudvalget angående Befordring af gods)’  
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entering into a contract of carriage with the carrier and being strictly liable for damage 
caused by dangerous goods. By the term “actual shipper” I will be referring to the person 
who delivers the good for carriage. In my opinion, “contracting shipper” also describes the 
legal position of that party in a more appropriate way and is in addition more in line with the 
international terminology.  
A carriage may engage several carriers. There is always at least one carrier, who enters into 
a contract with the contracting shipper, and he may or may not participate in the physical 
carriage of the cargo. There may also be one or several sub-carriers, to which the contracting 
carrier has let the execution of all or parts of the carriage. There is no express contract be-
tween the (original) contracting shipper and the sub-carrier(s), however, pursuant to FMC 
13:36 (§ 286), the sub-carrier is liable to the contracting shipper for his part of the carriage 
pursuant to the same rules as the carrier. By the same token, under FMC 13:40 (§ 290) and 
13:41 (§ 291), the contracting shipper is also directly liable to a sub-carrier for damage 
caused by the cargo. How the relationship between the contracting shipper and a sub-carrier 
shall be interpreted has been given consideration in Nordic doctrine. Nordic scholars and 
courts seem to acknowledge that there exists a legal principle within transport law according 
to which the carrier has a duty to care for goods in his disposition and that this duty will 
create a contractual relationship between a contracting shipper and a carrier who takes the 
goods in his charge.36 The contracting shipper’s liability to a sub-carrier who takes the goods 
in his charge must consequently also be considered contractual.  
Within maritime law the carrier has an extensive right to limit his liability.37 Firstly, the 
carrier enjoys a right to limit his liability for cargo damage pursuant to subject to NMC 13:30 
(§ 280). This right of limitation is restricted to the carrier only. Furthermore, there is global 
limitation which, in respect of liability for other damage than passenger injuries, is calculated 
on the basis of the gross tonnage of the carrying vessel. The right to global limitation has 
pursuant to FMC 9:1 and SMC 9:1 been extended to inter alia the contracting shipper of the 
goods. The contracting shipper was added to the group of persons entitled to global limitation 
in the material revision of the maritime codes of Finland and Sweden in 1994. However, 
according to previous preparatory works to the codes the contracting shipper could limit his 
                                                          
36 Lena Sisula-Tulokas, ‘Allmänna principer och transporträtt - direktkravsproblematiken i HD 2013:33’ 
(2014) 3 JFT 162, 169; Kurt Grönfors, ‘Fraktavtalet och den allmänna avtalsrätten’ [1988] SvJT 181, 61. See 
also HD 2013:33 from the Finnish Supreme Court. 
37 Cf. FMC Chapter 9.  
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liability also before 1994.38 The right to limit liability under FMC and SMC Chapter 9 com-
prises inter alia damage to persons and property and measures to discharge, destroy or render 
innocuous goods. The limitation right is lost where damage has been caused willfully or with 
gross negligence. However, neither the NoMC nor the DMC grant the contracting shipper 
any right of global limitation of liability. This constitutes a material difference from the con-
tracting shipper’s point of view, which must be considered when assessing whether it is de 
lege ferenda right to place a strict liability on the contracting shipper for dangerous goods.  
2.1.3. The scope of the mandatory application of Chapter 13 
The provisions on the contracting shipper’s liability for dangerous goods are contained in 
Chapter 13 of the NMC. The geographical scope of application of Chapter 13 is set out in 
NMC 13:2 (§ 252). The Nordic courts will apply Chapter 13 to domestic and inter-Nordic 
carriage. Chapter 13 will also be applicable where the carriage has no connection to the 
Nordic countries, but where the agreed port of discharge is a state bound by the HVR, or 
where the transport document has been issued in such a state. Chapter 13 will also apply 
where the transport document states that HVR or the law of an HVR member state shall be 
applicable. However, where neither the place of loading or delivery is in a Nordic country, 
the contractual parties are free to agree that their contract shall be governed by the laws of 
another HVR state. Otherwise the provisions of Chapter 13 will have mandatory application 
to the contracts of carriage which fall within its scope of application.39 The mandatory nature 
of Chapter 13 means that a contractual provision will be void to the extent it conflicts with 
the rules contained in Chapter 13. There are however a few exceptions from the mandatory 
application of Chapter 1340. Furthermore, the carrier’s obligations and liability may always 
be extended by agreement.41 However, as far as the contracting shipper’s liability for dan-
gerous goods is concerned, Chapter 13 does not allow any derogations.  
Chapter 13 governs contracts for the carriage of goods by sea.  The NMC contain no defini-
tion of such contracts, and there are thus no formal requirements for a contract of carriage 
of goods by sea.  However, pursuant to NMC 13:3 (§ 253) charterparties are explicitly ex-
cluded from the scope of application of Chapter 13.  
                                                          
38 Cf. Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen om ändring av sjölagen 10/1984 (Government Bill on amendment 
to the Finnish Maritime Code), 14 and Regeringens proposition om ändring av sjölagen 1982/83:159 (Govern-
ment Bill on amendment of the Martime Code, Sweden), 98-99.  
39 Cf. NMC 13:4 (§ 254). 
40 Cf. NMC 13:4 (§ 254) second paragraph.  
41 Cf. NMC 13:4 (§254). 
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Considering the wide geographical application of the HR/HVR and their mandatory nature, 
the strict liability rule, as set out in NMC 13:41 (§ 291), will generally come into play. How-
ever, where the contract of carriage is in the form of a charterparty, Chapter 13 can never be 
mandatorily applicable between the a charterer and the carrier.42 It should however be noted 
that it is not always easy to draw a distinct line between carriage of general cargo and char-
terparty carriage43, and the parties may enter into a charterparty agreement instead of any 
other contract of carriage for the purpose of avoiding the mandatory rules of Chapter 13. The 
provisions on the carriage of general goods were developed, and distinguished from the rules 
on voyage chartering, primarily with liner trades in mind.44 Also in modern trade, the man-
datory rules of Chapter 13 play its most prominent role in the liner trade, where the contract 
is usually in the form of a booking note and/or liner bill of lading.45  
2.1.4. The dangerous goods provisions in Chapter 13 
The contracting shipper’s strict liability for dangerous goods was introduced in the Nordic 
maritime codes in the revision in 1930’s.46 The main purpose of the revision was to imple-
ment the HR in the Nordic countries47, which in Article IV paragraph 6 provides for a strict 
liability in respect of damage caused by dangerous goods. In the report from the Swedish 
Maritime Law Committee it was established that the placing of a strict liability on the shipper 
in accordance with the HR was “hardly questionable”48, however, otherwise the Nordic pre-
paratory materials did not comment on the introduction of a strict liability for dangerous 
goods. It is also difficult to trace the motives for the strict liability under the HR, however it 
is clear that the convention was modelled on the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act of 
                                                          
42 Cf. Chapter 14:2 (§ 322) and 14:21 (§ 342). 
43 For a more detailed discussion on the problems associated with distinguishing carriage of general cargo from 
charterparty carriage, see Kurt Grönfors, Sjölagens bestämmelser om godsbefordran (P.A. Norstedt & Söners 
förlag 1982), 24 f.; Thor Falkanger, Hans J Bull and Lasse Brautaset, Scandinavian Maritime Law: The Nor-
wegian Perspective 4th ed. (Universitetsforlaget 2017), 385-386; Jan Hellner, ‘Sjölagen 1994. Några lagtsift-
ningstekniska synpunkter.’ in Peter Wetterstein and Anders Beijer (eds), Essays in honour of Hugo Tiberg: 
Professor of maritime law (Norstedts juridik AB 1996), 337 f.; Committee Report on Carriage of Goods by 
Sea, Sweden (Statens offentliga utredningar SOU 1990:13), ‘Översyn av sjölagen 2. Godsbefordran till sjöss. 
Slutbetänkande av sjölagsutredningen.’ , 83; NOU 1993:36, ‘Committee Report on Carriage of Goods by Sea, 
Norway (Norges offentlige utredninger): Godsbefordring til sjøs. Utredning XV fra utvalget til revisjon av 
sjøfartslovgivningen (Sjølovkomiteen).’ , 57-58. 
44 Grönfors, Sjölagens bestämmelser om godsbefordran (n 43), 26.  
45 Falkanger, Bull and Brautaset (n 43), 320; Hannu Honka, ‘Introduction’ in Hannu Honka (ed), New carriage 
of goods by sea: The Nordic approach including comparisions with some other jurisdictions (Institute of Mar-
time and Commercial Law 1997), 3-4. 
46 Cf. Finnish Maritime Code 167/1939, Section 97. However, at that time, the liability was placed on the 
shipper.  
47 Statens offentliga utredningar (SOU 1936:17), ‘Förslag till lag om ändringar i vissa delar av sjölagen m.m. 
avgivet av 1933 års sjölagstiftningskommitté’ (1936), 281 f.  
48 ibid, 116.  
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1910 and US Harter Act of 1893.49 Against this background, it may be assumed that the strict 
liability in HR was inspired by the absolute warranty for dangerous goods at common law. 
In the leading case Brass v. Maitland50 from 1856 the majority held that there is an implied 
warranty from the shipper that the goods are non-dangerous and that this warranty is abso-
lute, meaning that it is irrelevant whether the shipper was not ought to be aware of the dan-
gerous properties of the goods.51 The judge Lord Campbell, C.J., reasoned in the following 
way in placing an absolute obligation on the contracting shipper not to ship dangerous goods: 
“If the plaintiffs and those employed by them did not know and had no means of knowing the dangerous 
quality of the goods which caused the calamity, it seems most unjust and inexpedient to say that they 
have not remedy against those who might easily have prevented it… [I]t seems much more just and 
expedient that, although they were ignorant of the dangerous qualities of the goods, or the insufficiency 
of the packing, the loss occasioned by the dangerous quality of the goods and the insufficient packing 
should be cast upon the shippers than upon the shipowners.”52 
The rationale of the contracting shipper’s strict liability was thus that he is in a better position 
to know the goods he is shipping. The court considered the situation when neither the carrier 
nor the contracting shipper was aware of the dangerous properties and found that it was 
appropriate to place the liability on the shipper also then. The same reasoning must be as-
sumed to justify the strict liability under the international carriage regimes and the NMC.53  
The contracting shipper’s obligations and liability in respect of dangerous goods are regu-
lated in NMC 13:7 (§ 257) and 13:41 (§ 291).  
NMC 13:7 reads as follows54: 
Section 7. Dangerous goods 
Dangerous goods must be suitably marked as dangerous. The contracting shipper shall in due time in-
form the carrier and actual carrier to whom the goods are delivered of the dangerous nature of the goods 
and shall indicate the precautions that may be needed. 
Where the contracting shipper in any other case is aware that the goods are of such a nature that the 
carriage may involve risks or essential inconvenience to any person, vessel or goods, he shall likewise 
give notice to this effect. 
                                                          
49 ibid, 283.  
50 Brass v. Maitland & Ewing (1856) 6 El. & Bl. 470. 
51 William Tetley, Brian G McDonough and Elliott B Nixon, Marine cargo claims (International shipping laws, 
3rd ed. International Shipping Publications, BLAIS 1988), 463.  
52 Brass v. Maitland & Ewing (1856) 6 El. & Bl. 470. 
53 In ND 1941.353 Else the court established that one of the underlying motives for the contracting shipper’s 
strict liability is that the contracting shipper generally is in a better position to control the properties of the 
goods.  
54 The English translation is borrowed from Hannu Honka (ed.), New carriage of goods by sea: The Nordic 
approach including comparisons with some other jurisdictions (Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law 
1997), Appendix 1. According to Honka the same translation is found in Publication L 37/95 of the Ministry 
of Transport and Communications in Finland. At the time of writing this thesis, the translation is however not 
available anymore. 
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Section 7 (§ 257), first paragraph, sets out the contracting shipper’s obligations when ship-
ping dangerous goods; he shall notify the contracting and the first actual carrier in due time 
of the dangerous characteristics of the goods and inform them of necessary precautionary 
measures. Furthermore, the goods shall be suitably marked as dangerous. The second para-
graph of the section states that the contracting shipper shall also provide the same kind of 
information to the carrier where he knows that the goods may cause danger or substantial 
inconvenience to persons, ship or cargo. This stipulation has been included with considera-
tion to inter alia contraband, goods under quarantine or other goods of a delicate nature that 
may lead to embargoes or similar international implications.55 The definition of contraband 
etc. as dangerous goods is broader than the HR/HVR concept on dangerous goods, but fol-
lows an old Nordic approach which dates back to the pre-Hague days.56 Furthermore, as will 
be concluded further on, a distinction must be made between the dangerous goods under the 
first and second paragraph when considering the scope of the contracting shipper’s strict 
liability.    
Section 7 (§ 257) does not contain any definition of “dangerous” goods. However, as the 
further study will show, the Nordic Government Bills on the NMC provides that national 
and international safety rules will provide guidance on what should at least be included in 
the definition.  
It should however be noted that it is not sufficient for the contracting shipper to inform the 
carrier of the dangerous nature of the goods. He is also obliged to provide the carrier with 
information on necessary safety measures. What “necessary” measures means depends on 
the type of cargo. Public safety rules, such as the International Maritime Dangerous Goods 
Code (IMDG Code), contains guidelines on how dangerous goods shall be stowed and se-
cured.  
Furthermore, the first paragraph of Section 7 (§ 257) provides that information must be given 
in due time. What a timely notification means shall be decided on a case-by-case assessment, 
considering inter alia how the nature of the goods and the required safety measures may 
affect the vessel’s stowage plan.57 In many cases it is sufficient to provide notification where 
                                                          
55 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 35.  
56 Honka, ‘New Carriage of Goods by Sea - The Nordic Approach’ (n 11), 155-156. 
57 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 35.   
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the goods are handed over to the carrier, but in other cases it must be given much earlier for 
the carrier to be able to prepare the necessary safety measures.58  
Pursuant to Section 7 (§ 291), the information shall be given to the contracting carrier and 
the sub-carrier who takes delivery of the goods. There is always one contracting carrier, but 
there may be several performing carriers. The extended sphere of persons to which the con-
tracting shipper owes an obligation to inform is based on the Hamburg Rules Article 13. It 
should however be noted that the Hamburg Rules provide that the information shall be given 
to the carrier or an actual carrier to which the contracting shipper hands over the dangerous 
goods. Under the Hamburg Rules, the rule is optional, whereas NMC seem to require that 
both the contractual and first actual carrier shall be informed. In Honka’s interpretation, 
information shall be given to both.59 He finds support in the Finnish Bill, which states that, 
where the goods are delivered directly to a sub-carrier, the information shall also be given 
to him.60 
However, when reading Section 7 (§ 257) in conjunction with Section 41 (§ 291), the correct 
interpretation must be that the contracting shipper escapes strict liability where he has in-
formed the carrier, be it the contracting carrier or a sub-carrier, who takes delivery of the 
goods. The reports of the Norwegian and Danish Maritime Committees expressly states that 
the contracting shipper is only obliged to provide the receiving carrier with the necessary 
information, as he is the party who in fact benefits from such information.61 The Finnish 
Government Bill’s comments on Section 41 (§ 291) are not as explicit, but states that the 
contracting shipper is strictly liable towards all carriers that takes the goods in their charge, 
but that a carrier further down the transport chain cannot invoke the strict liability where the 
contracting shipper has given information to the carrier taking delivery of the goods.62 On 
the basis of this is it should be fairly safe to conclude that, for the purpose of the strict liability 
rule, the contracting shipper has fulfilled his obligation where the first carrier is informed.  
NMC 13:41 (§ 291) stipulates the contracting shipper’s strict liability for damage caused by 
cargo considered “dangerous”: 
                                                          
58 ibid, 35.  
59 Honka, ‘New Carriage of Goods by Sea - The Nordic Approach’ (n 11), 156.  
60 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 35.  
61 NOU 1993:36 (n 43), 43; Committee Report 2 on Carriage of Goods by Sea, Denmark (n 35), 76.   
62 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 50. 
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Section 41. Dangerous goods 
Where the contracting shipper has handed over dangerous goods to the carrier or to an actual carrier 
without informing him according to section 7 of the dangerous character of the goods and the necessary 
precautions, and where the person who takes over the goods does not otherwise have knowledge of their 
dangerous character, the contracting shipper is liable to the carrier and any actual carrier for costs and 
any other loss resulting from the carriage of such goods. In such a case, the carrier or the actual carrier 
may unload, render innocuous or destroy the goods, as the circumstances may require, without any 
liability to pay compensation. 
The provisions of paragraph 1 may not be invoked by any person who with knowledge of the dangerous 
character of the goods has taken them in his charge. 
If goods become an actual danger for person or property, the carrier may, according to the circumstances 
unload, render innocuous or destroy such goods without any liability to pay compensation.  
The first paragraph stipulates the main liability rule and the preconditions for the contracting 
shipper’s strict liability. Pursuant to the second paragraph, the strict liability rule shall how-
ever not apply where a carrier has been aware of the dangerous properties of the goods. 
Section 41 (§ 291) refers to Section 7 (§ 257) in general with regards to the contracting 
shipper’s obligations to inform, however, “dangerous goods” in Section 41 (§ 291) has been 
interpreted so as to referring only to the kind of goods as mentioned under the first paragraph 
of Section 7 (§ 257).63  
Where a cargo is considered “dangerous” for the purpose of NMC 13:41 (§ 291), there are 
two preconditions for the application of the strict liability; the contracting shipper’s failure 
to fulfill his obligation to inform pursuant to Section 7 (§ 257) first paragraph and the carrier 
not being otherwise aware of the dangerous properties of the goods. When read together, the 
core requirement for the strict liability not to apply must be that the carrier shall have 
knowledge on the dangerousness of the goods.  
Where the strict liability rule in Section 41 (§ 291) does not apply, either because the goods 
are not considered dangerous or because the carrier is aware of their dangerous properties, 
the ordinary liability rule of Section 40 (§ 290) shall be applied. In that case the carrier must 
prove fault or negligence on the part of the contracting shipper. 
2.2.The previous Nordic maritime codes 
As have already been concluded, it was not the intention of the legislator to make any mate-
rial amendments to the provisions on dangerous goods in the 1994 revision of the NMC.64 
This makes case law dating from before 1994 still relevant and will thus be considered fur-
ther on in the interpretation the current state of law. However, as the wording of Section 92 
                                                          
63 Cf. discussion in 3.4.1.  
64 Honka, ‘New Carriage of Goods by Sea - The Nordic Approach’ (n 11), 158.  
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and 97 of the previous Nordic codes65 were slightly different from the current NMC 13:7 (§ 
257) and 13:41 (§ 291), it is necessary to take a brief look at the previous regulation.  
After the revision of the Nordic codes in the 1930’s Section 92, stipulating the shipper’s 
duties in respect of dangerous goods, read in the following way (my translation): 
“Inflammable, explosive and other dangerous goods shall at the time of shipment be marked as danger-
ous, where possible, and the shipper shall give any information necessary to prevent damage.  
Where the shipper is aware that the transport of the goods being shipped may otherwise cause essential 
inconvenience to any person, ship or goods, the shipper shall also inform of this.” 
Section 97 set out the liability of the shipper: 
“If goods delivered have caused damage to the carrier or other party, the shipper has a duty to pay 
damages, insofar as he or someone he is responsible for are guilty of fault or neglect. 
If the damage is caused by inflammable, explosive or other dangerous goods, which have been loaded 
without the carrier having knowledge of such characteristics, the shipper is liable, even in the absence 
of fault or neglect”.  
It shall be noted that the liability and obligations were imposed on the shipper, i.e. the person 
delivering the goods to the carrier. Section 97 was however amended in the 1970’s to bring 
the NMC more in line with the HVR in this regard.66  
“If goods have caused damage to the carrier or damage to the ship, the charterer is liable for to pay 
damages, if he or someone he is responsible for has been guilty of fault or neglect. 
If, in the case of carriage of general cargo, inflammable, explosive or other dangerous goods have been 
loaded without the carrier having knowledge of these characteristics, the charterer is liable for all loss 
which is a direct or indirect consequence of the loading of the goods, even in the absence of fault or 
neglect.” 
It was considered more appropriate then to place the liability on the charterer, as the char-
terer and the shipper are often the same person in general cargo carriage.67 As already con-
cluded, the NMC nowadays impose both obligations and liability in respect of dangerous 
goods on the contracting shipper. The provisions on dangerous goods in the previous codes 
were based on the HVR and the main differences to the current regulation is the specification 
“inflammable, explosive or other dangerous goods” in the previous codes and that there was 
no explicit link between the obligation to inform and the strict liability.  
                                                          
65 Finnish Maritime Code 167/1939, Swedish Maritime Code 1891:35 as amended by the Act 1936:276, Nor-
wegian Maritime Code of 1893 as amended by Act no. 3 in 1938 and the Danish Maritime Code of 1892 as 
amended by Act nr. 150 in 1937.  
66 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till lag om ändring av sjölagen 116/1974 (Government 
Bill on the amendment of the Maritime Code, Finland), 7; Grönfors, Sjölagens bestämmelser om godsbeford-
ran (n 43), 112.  
67 Ot.prp.nr.28 (1972–1973) Om lov om endringer i lov 20. juli 1893 nr. 1 om sjøfarten og i visse andre lover 
(Government Bill 28 (1972-73) on Amendment of the Maritime Code, Norway), 9. 
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2.3.Hague-Visby Rules 
HVR Article IV paragraph 6 contains stipulations on the carrier’s right and the contracting 
shipper’s liability in connection with the shipment of dangerous goods: 
”Goods of an inflammable, explosive or dangerous nature to the shipment whereof the carrier, master or 
agent of the carrier has not consented with knowledge of their nature and character, may at any time before 
discharge be landed at any place, or destroyed or rendered innocuous by the carrier without compensation 
and the shipper of such goods shall be liable for all damages and expenses directly or indirectly arising out 
of or resulting from such shipment…”  
Under the HVR, as well as under the HR, the contracting shipper (the shipper pursuant to 
the terminology of the HVR) is strictly liable where the carrier has not consented to carrying 
the dangerous goods with knowledge of their nature and character. The strict liability covers 
goods “of an inflammable, explosive or dangerous nature”.  
2.4.Hamburg Rules 
As already noted, the NMC have incorporated the provisions of the Hamburg Rules to the 
extent they do not contradict the HVR. The Hamburg Rules contain similar dangerous goods 
provisions as the HVR, but with some specifications. The Nordic countries have adopted the 
Hamburg model in respect of liability for dangerous goods. In comparison to HVR, the Ham-
burg Rules bring along some explicit obligations of the contracting shipper; pursuant to Ar-
ticle 13.1 the contracting shipper must mark or label the goods in a suitable manner and 
subject to Article 13.2 inform the carrier to whom the goods are handed over of the danger-
ous character of the goods and precautionary measures. If the contracting shipper omits his 
obligations and the carrier is not otherwise aware of the dangerous properties, the contracting 
shipper will be strictly liable. The strict liability rule under Article 13.2 reads as follows:  
“Where the shipper hands over dangerous goods to the carrier or an actual carrier, as the case may be, 
the shipper must inform him of the dangerous character of the goods and, if necessary, of the precau-
tions to be taken. If the shipper fails to do so and such carrier or actual carrier does not otherwise have 
knowledge of their dangerous character: 
(a) The shipper is liable to the carrier and any actual carrier for the loss resulting from the shipment 
of such goods, and 
(b) The goods may at any time be unloaded, destroyed or rendered innocuous, as the circumstances 
may require, without payment of compensation.”  
 
3. What goods are dangerous? 
3.1.An overview 
A crucial issue in the discussion on contracting shipper’s strict liability is what kind of goods 
are considered dangerous. The distinction between dangerous and non-dangerous, or ordi-
nary, goods is crucial as the standards of liability differ depending on the nature of the goods. 
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There is however no distinct line between dangerous and ordinary goods, as there is no com-
plete and updated list of all dangerous goods. The maintenance of such a list would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, due to the constant emergence of new chemical substances. Further-
more, some goods can become dangerous under certain circumstances only. Rather success-
ful attempts have however been made to uphold lists of dangerous goods.  
Neither the NMC nor the international carriage conventions provide any express definition 
of “dangerous goods”. In the Nordic countries, the Government Bills on the NMC provide 
some guidance as to the interpretation of the notion of “dangerous goods”. According to the 
Finnish Bill, the notion shall include all kinds of substances that may directly or indirectly 
cause damage to people, environment and property.68 Further guidance for determining the 
dangerous nature of a particular cargo may be sought in public safety rules, such as Chapter 
VII of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS Convention), 
which has been enacted nationally69, Government Decree on the Transport of Dangerous 
Goods in Packaged Form by Sea (DGD) and Decisions given by the Finnish Transport and 
Communications Agency (Traficom) pursuant to the Decree.70 The IMDG Code, which now 
is a mandatory part of the SOLAS Convention, also provides important guidelines when 
assessing the dangerousness of a specific cargo. The most important national and interna-
tional public safety rules in this context will be dealt with further in sub-chapter 3.3.  
The Finnish Bill states that a substance may be considered dangerous even where it is not 
covered by any of the listed regulations.71 Consequently other rules of law may also be con-
sidered when determining what goods are “dangerous”. Furthermore, a factual assessment 
of the “dangerousness” of a particular cargo is necessary. According to the second Danish 
Committee Report on carriage of goods by sea, there is however a presumption of “non-
dangerousness” where the specific goods cannot be found in any of the public safety rules.72 
Under the NMC a distinction must also be made between dangerous goods as referred to in 
13:7.1 (§ 257.1) , and goods “of such a nature that the carriage may involve risks or essential 
inconvenience” pursuant to 13:7.2 (§ 257.2). This is because the latter category falls outside 
                                                          
68 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 35. 
69 Finnish Treaty Series 11/81.  
70 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 35.  
71 ibid, 35. 
72 Committee Report 2 on Carriage of Goods by Sea, Denmark (n 35), 44. 
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the scope of the strict liability rule under 13:41 (§ 291).73 Nordic case law provides guidance 
as to the factual assessment of the dangerousness of a particular cargo. Foreign case law may 
be useful in drawing conclusions on the interpretation of the dangerous goods provisions of 
HVR, on which the NMC are founded. In sub-chapter 3.4, relevant case law will be analyzed 
to lay out the guiding principles for determining what goods are considered dangerous. 
Furthermore, parties to a carriage contract may sometimes include provisions in their con-
tract with detailed descriptions of the goods that are to be considered dangerous.74 However, 
such a contractual provision may be invalid. An overview of the parties’ freedom of contract 
in respect of liability for dangerous goods will be provided in the next.  
3.2.Dangerous goods clauses in the contract 
As the national and international carriage of goods regimes do not provide any definition of 
“dangerous”, the parties to a contract of carriage may be tempted to agree on what “danger-
ous” shall mean for the purpose of their relationship. However, such contractual provisions 
may turn out to be ineffective, as the provisions of the NMC are to a large extent mandatory 
for the benefit of the contracting shipper, and can only be derogated from by way of increas-
ing the liability and obligations of the carrier.75 Even though an express definition would 
primarily be to the advantage of the contracting shipper, who would not have to bear the risk 
of misjudging the dangerousness of the goods, it is not clear whether NMC permits such 
derogations. However, in practice it is not very common to include such detailed definitions 
in contracts of carriage. From the carrier’s point of view it is preferable to let the definition 
of “dangerous” be subject to a factual assessment in the particular case. Despite this, dan-
gerous goods clauses can sometimes be found in time charterparties and also in bills of lading 
and waybills.76 In most cases these clauses do not even purport to provide any specific or 
even general definition of “dangerous”, but may list goods that shall at least be considered 
dangerous.77  
                                                          
73 Cf. discussion in sub-chapter 3.4.1. 
74 Falkanger, Bull and Brautaset (n 43), 369.  
75 Cf. NMC 13:4 (§ 254) 
76 Meltem D Güner-Özbek, The carriage of dangerous goods by sea (Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs, 
Springer 2008), 43.  
77 See Hapag-Lloyd Bill of Lading, Terms and Conditions, Clause 19: “No Goods which are or may become 
dangerous, inflammable or damaging (including radioactive materials), shall be tendered to the Carrier for 
Carriage without his express consent in writing…”. Mitsui OSK Lines Combined Transport Bill of Lading 
contains a similar dangerous goods clause.  
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3.3.Public safety regulation 
3.3.1. National safety regulation in Finland 
As mentioned previously, the Finnish Bill lists public safety regulations that may be con-
sulted when assessing whether a cargo is dangerous or not.78 This is however not an exhaus-
tive list and also other regulations may be considered. This chapter will take a look at the 
most important national and international safety rules in this context.  
In Finland, the general provisions on the transport of dangerous goods, irrespective of mode 
of transport, are gathered in the Act on Transport of Dangerous Goods (719/1994) (DGA). 
The Act defines “dangerous goods” in the following way:  
“[D]angerous goods shall mean a substance, which by hazard of explosion, inflammation, risk 
of infection or radiation, toxicity, corrosiveness or other such property may cause damage to 
people, the environment or property. The provisions of this Act on dangerous goods shall also 
apply to dangerous compounds, articles, devices, goods, empty packagings, genetically mod-
ified organisms and microorganisms.” 
This is a broad definition which includes many kinds of substances. The core of the defini-
tion is however that the substance shall be apt to cause damage to people, environment and 
property. Furthermore, Section 3a of the DGA provides that dangerous substances shall be 
divided into nine categories on the basis of degree of danger and that Traficom may issue 
further instructions on the classification of dangerous goods. It may be assumed that the 
categorization of the goods is based on the UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dan-
gerous Goods (UN Recommendations), as these also set out nine dangerous goods classes 
and play an important role in setting the basis of the dangerous goods regulations for all 
modes of transport.79 The UN Recommendations will be discussed briefly further on in sub-
chapter 3.3.2. It shall however be noted that there is a crucial limitation in the scope of ap-
plication of the DGA in that it does not apply to transport of goods as bulk cargo nor to 
transport in vessels equipped with liquid or gas tanks. This follows the limitation of the 
IMDG Code, which covers only goods in packaged form. There are separate regulations in 
respect of those kinds of transports which are outside the scope of the DGA and the IMDG.  
For the purpose of carriage of (packaged) dangerous goods by sea in Finland, the DGD pro-
vides more specific provisions, however, without giving any further guidance on the inter-
pretation of “dangerous”. The DGD specifies inter alia the contracting and actual shippers’ 
                                                          
78 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 35.  
79 Lauri Railas, ‘Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Law: The Case of Finland’ (2006). DaGoB Publication 
Series 3:2006, 8.  
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administrative obligations to mark the goods and requirements for the marking, competence 
of personnel and the stowage and the securing of the goods.  
Pursuant to Section 3a and 24 of the DGA, Traficom is authorized to issue regulations on 
technical details on inter alia the classification and marking of dangerous goods. These may 
provide further guidelines for the interpretation of “dangerous” in a particular case.  
The national laws and provisions on the carriage of dangerous goods are to a large extent 
based on international conventions and regulations. In the maritime context, the SOLAS 
Convention Chapter VII and IMDG Code play prominent roles. SOLAS Convention Chapter 
VII has been implemented nationally in Finland.80 Since 2004 the SOLAS Convention 
makes the application of the IMDG Code on the carriage of dangerous goods in packaged 
form mandatory. The other Nordic countries have corresponding national dangerous goods 
regulations, which also greatly are based on the international instruments.81  
3.3.2. International safety regulation 
SOLAS Convention 
The first SOLAS Convention was drafted already in 1914, but never entered into force.82 It 
did however not contain any provisions on the carriage of dangerous goods, and neither did 
the 1929 SOLAS Convention, which entered into force in 1933. In the 1948 SOLAS Con-
vention Chapter VI however specifically governed the carriage of dangerous goods. Chapter 
VI Regulation 3 listed types of goods, such as explosives, corrosives and poisons, which was 
considered dangerous and prohibited the carriage if such goods unless carried in accordance 
with the convention. Some dangerous goods were allowed for carriage provided necessary 
adequate safety measures were undertaken. Furthermore, the shipper was obliged to provide 
the carrier with a written statement on the dangerousness classification of the goods. The 
goods were also to be marked as dangerous. Each contracting state was obliged to issue more 
detailed national rules on the packing and stowage of dangerous goods.  
                                                          
80 Finnish Treaty Series 11/81. 
81 Sunniva Frislid Meyer, ‘Regelverk for transport av farlig gods på vei versus til sjøs’ (Oslo 2013) 
1254/2013, 3; Swedish Transport Agency (Transportstyrelsen), ‘Förpackat farligt gods’ <https://www.trans-
portstyrelsen.se/sv/sjofart/Miljo-och-halsa/Gods-last-avfall/Forpackat-farligt-gods/> accessed 16 July 2019 
82 International Maritime Organization, ‘Focus on IMO: SOLAS: the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea, 1974’ (1998) <http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Regulations/Documents/SOLAS98fi-
nal.pdf%20International%20Conven-
tion%20for%20the%20Safety,%20of%20Life%20at%20Sea,%201974%20(October%201998).pdf> accessed 
13 October 2019 
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The true impact of the SOLAS Convention came in 1960, when the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) had been established and been given the assignment of developing mar-
itime safety legislation.83 In connection with the adoption of the fourth SOLAS Convention, 
which was a completely new instrument, several Resolutions were adopted by the IMO.84 
One of these requested the IMO to develop uniform rules on the carriage of dangerous goods 
by sea. The Resolution resulted in the IMDG Code in 1965. The IMDG Code will be dealt 
with further on.  
Part A of Chapter VII of the SOLAS Convention covers the carriage of goods in packaged 
form and contains provisions on inter alia the classification, packing, marking, labelling and 
stowage of the goods. Pursuant to Regulation 2.3 the carriage of dangerous goods is prohib-
ited unless it is carried in accordance with the convention. In part A dangerous goods are 
defined as substances, materials and articles covered by the IMDG Code.85 Furthermore, 
Chapter VII requires that relevant parts of the IMDG Code shall be complied with when 
carrying dangerous goods.86  
Part A-1 in turn deals with dangerous goods in solid form in bulk and includes provisions 
on documentation, stowage and segregation of such goods. Part B covers requirements on 
how ships carrying dangerous liquid chemicals in bulk shall be equipped and construed. 
Furthermore, it requires chemical tankers to comply with the International Bulk Chemical 
Code (IBC Code). Part C is concerned with the construction and equipment of ships carrying 
liquified gases in bulk and that these shall fulfill the requirements of the International Gas 
Carrier Code (IGC Code). Finally, part D includes requirements on the carriage of packaged 
irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and high-level radioactive wastes on ships. Pursuant to 
part D, ships carrying such substances are required to comply with the International Code 
for the Safe Carriage of Packaged Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radi-
oactive Wastes on Board Ships (INF Code).  
Chapter VII of the SOLAS Convention thus contains provisions on various types of danger-
ous goods carried in different forms. These provisions may help determining whether a par-
ticular cargo is dangerous or not. However, the IMDG Code plays a prominent role in provid-
ing a comprehensive list of packaged dangerous goods and a classification of the goods into 
                                                          
83 ibid, 2.  
84 ibid.  
85 SOLAS Convention, Chapter VII, Regulation 1. 
86 SOLAS Convention, Chapter VII, Regulation 3.  
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nine categories with special handling requirements. The IMDG Code list of dangerous goods 
is also decisive for the definition of dangerous goods in Parts A and A-1 and of “INF cargo” 
in Part D.87  Furthermore, the IMDG Code is referred to in the International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention) for the purpose of defining 
“harmful substances”.88 The IMDG Code will therefore be dealt with in more detail. 
IMDG Code 
The IMDG Code was adopted in 1965 by the IMO Assembly. Since the 2004 SOLAS the 
IMDG Code has been mandatory for all ships within the convention’s scope of application.89 
This means that ships flagged in the Nordic countries, and all other contracting states, are 
now bound by the provisions of the IMDG Code.  
The contents of the IMDG Code are based on the UN Recommendations, which was issued 
for the first time in 1956 as a report by the Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dan-
gerous Goods (CETDG) of the United Nation Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
waiting for the IMO to become operative and to respond to the an urgently increasing need 
of uniform rules in the carriage of dangerous goods.90 The UN Recommendations are aimed 
at providing a general framework for the carriage of dangerous goods in all modes of 
transport by presenting “Model Regulations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods”.91 The 
Model Regulations contains inter alia principles of classification of dangerous goods, listings 
of dangerous goods, general packing requirements and rules on marking, labelling or plac-
arding.  
The IMDG Code consequently sets out provisions on inter alia classification, packaging, 
marking and labeling of packaged dangerous goods carried by sea. In order to keep the Code 
in line with the provisions of the UN Recommendations, it is revised biennially.92 The IMDG 
Code allocates dangerous goods into nine classes depending on the type of danger they rep-
resent.93 Chapter 3.2. of the Code contains a Dangerous Goods List, listing all goods which 
                                                          
87 Cf. Regulations 1, 7 and 14 of Chapter VII of SOLAS Convention. 
88 MARPOL Convention, Annex 3, Regulation 1.  
89 Resolution MSC 122 (75) 
90 Güner-Özbek (n 76), 12. 
91 UNECE, ‘About the Recommendations: UN Model Regulations’ <https://www.unece.org/?id=3598> ac-
cessed 3 November 2019. 
92 Swedish Transport Agency (Transportstyrelsen), ‘The IMDG Code’ <https://www.transportstyrel-
sen.se/en/shipping/Environmental-protection/Freight--Cargo/Bulk-Cargoes/The-IMDG-Code/> accessed 22 
July 2019 
93 The classes are the following: Class 1 – Explosives, Class 2 – Gases, Class 3 – Flammable liquids, Class 4 
– Flammable solids and other flammable substances, Class 5 – Oxidizing substances and Organic peroxides, 
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are classified as dangerous and their specific handling requirements. However, not all sub-
stances and articles are listed by name. There are also entries for groups of substances.94 
Each class has its own definition, which should assist in determining whether a particular 
substance is dangerous and to what class it should be assigned. Goods classified as danger-
ous are given UN Numbers and Proper Shipping Names (PSN).95 The IMDG Code provides 
both general and more specific technical instructions on how dangerous goods shall be pack-
aged, labelled and marked. Pursuant to 2.0.0.1. of the IMDG Code (Amendment 38-16) the 
classification of the goods shall be made by the shipper or, where specified in the code, the 
competent authority of the member state. The Code also requires the shipper to issue a dan-
gerous goods declaration, whereby it is stated that the goods are properly packaged, marked 
and labelled, and in proper condition for the transport pursuant to applicable regulations.96 
3.3.3. Summary on the discussion on public safety regulation 
There are a range of national and international regulations on the carriage of dangerous goods 
by sea. These set out administrative rules aimed at promoting the safety of ships and shipping 
operations and protecting human life, environment and property. Even though these are not 
primarily aimed at governing the distribution of obligations and liability between the parties 
to a contract of carriage, these provide useful guidelines for the determination of what con-
stitutes “dangerous goods” pursuant to the strict liability rule under NMC 13:41 (§ 291). All 
these sets of rules after all have the common purpose to prevent damage caused by the car-
riage of dangerous goods. However, the public safety regulations only provide interpreta-
tional guidance, and a cargo can presumably be considered non-dangerous for the purpose 
of NMC 13:41 (§ 291) despite being listed as dangerous. On the contrary, a cargo can also 
be defined as dangerous even where it is not included in any dangerous goods lists.97 In the 
                                                          
Class 6 – Toxic and infectious substances, Class 7 – Radioactive material, Class 8 – Corrosive substances, 
Class 9 – Miscellaneous dangerous substances and articles.   
94 See IMDG Code Amendment 38-16, 2.0.2.2. The four type of entries in the Dangerous Goods List are 1) 
single entries for well-defined substances or articles 2) generic entries for well-defined groups of substances 
or articles 3) specific N.O.S .entries covering a group of substances or articles of a particular chemical or 
technical nature and 4) general N .O .S .entries covering a group of substances or articles meeting the criteria 
of one or more classes. 
95 IMDG Code (Amendment 38-16), 2.0.2.1. 
96 IMDG Code (Amendment 38-16), 5.4.1.6.1. 
97 Hugo Tiberg, ‘Legal Survey’ in Kurt Grönfors (ed), Damage from Goods (Skrifter/ Sjörättsföreningen i 
Göteborg vol 58. Akademiförlaget 1978), 17, where it is stated that: “On the other hand the IMDG list of 
dangerous goods can hardly be taken to be exclusive in the sense of relieving the shipper of liability if he has 
dug up some new kind of cargo, not listed in IMDG, which has manifestly dangerous characteristics. And if 
goods are shipped from a country where the shipment is not governed by IMDG, the questions… must be 
decided quite independently of IMDG.” 
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end the determination of what cargo is considered dangerous must be based on a factual 
assessment of the properties of the goods.   
3.4. Factual assessment of the dangerousness of the goods 
3.4.1. Assessment of the dangerous nature and state of the goods 
The preparatory works to the NMC provide that a particular substance may be considered 
dangerous even where it is not listed in any public safety regulation.98 The report of the 
Norwegian Maritime Committee makes clear that the public safety rules listing dangerous 
goods are not exhaustive or decisive.99 This implies that a factual assessment of the danger-
ousness of the goods shall be conducted in all cases, both where goods are listed as dangerous 
and where they are not. However, the Danish Committee Report provides that the non-listing 
of a particular substance constitutes a presumption of non-dangerousness.100 Given the ex-
tensive work with revising the IMDG Code to keep pace with the constant emergence of 
new substances, it is reasonable to give the instrument this interpretational significance.   
Nordic case law supports the conduct of a factual assessment of the goods’ dangerousness. 
In the case ND 1941.353 Else (DCC) the court reasoned that a cargo of steel shavings was 
dangerous, even though not generally considered having dangerous properties. The cargo 
self-heated during sea carriage, probably due to remains of oil and twist in the cargo in com-
bination with the cargo being wet. In ND 1954.364 Florø (NCC) the court found a cargo of 
ferro-silicon being dangerous due to its ability to emit noxious gases when becoming humid, 
even though it is not normally considered dangerous. In ND 1959.55 Grethe (NCC) the court 
conducted a detailed analysis on the interpretation of “dangerous goods” in Section 92.1 of 
the previous maritime code (today’s 13:7.1, § 257.1). It concluded that the definition in-
cluded goods which in the actual case are dangerous, irrespective of whether they would be 
considered dangerous in other conditions. To adopt the terminology of Brækhus, it could be 
more appropriate to talk of the “dangerous state” of the goods. According to him, “state” 
means that the goods possess properties which derogate from what can normally be expected 
from the type of goods.101 However, this change of terminology would risk extending the 
                                                          
98 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 35; Regeringens proposition om ny sjölag 1993/94:195 (Govern-
ment Bill on a New Maritime Code, Sweden), 219; NOU 1993:36 (n 43), 25; Committee Report 2 on Car-
riage of Goods by Sea, Denmark (n 35), 44.  
99 NOU 1993:36 (n 43), 25.  
100 Committee Report 2 on Carriage of Goods by Sea, Denmark (n 35), 44.  
101 Sjur Brækhus, ‘Sjøtransportørens ansvar for lasteskader’ in Peter Wetterstein and Anders Beijer (eds), Es-
says in honour of Hugo Tiberg: Professor of maritime law (Norstedts juridik AB 1996), 103. 
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scope of NMC 13:41.1 (§ 291.1) to goods that are not inherently dangerous, which in prin-
ciple would mean than any kind of cargo could pose danger if handled incorrectly. For a 
separate liability rule on damage caused by “dangerous goods” to make sense, the danger 
must be linked to the properties of the goods. The distinction between “dangerous goods” 
and ordinary goods which may cause damage under Nordic law will be further discussed in 
sub-chapter 3.4.2. 
3.4.2. The distinction between inherently dangerous and semi-dangerous goods 
In the general understanding of the notion “dangerous goods” the danger is connected to the 
inherent nature of the goods. However, the danger is often triggered by surrounding circum-
stances, such as the goods coming in contact with other substances or humidity. Furthermore 
goods, such as contraband, may cause delay to the ship and cargo onboard without posing a 
physical danger to the property. Shall such dangerous situations fall within the scope of the 
contracting shipper’s strict liability? 
In NMC a distinction has been made between “proper” dangerous goods, as referred to in 
NMC 13:7.1 (§ 257.1), and other goods of such a nature that the carriage may involve risks 
or essential inconvenience pursuant to NMC 13:7.2 (§ 257.2). In the following discussion 
the goods under the first paragraph of NMC 13:7 (§ 257) will be referred to as “inherently 
dangerous goods”, whereas goods under the second paragraph will be defined as “semi-dan-
gerous”. The Finnish and Swedish preparatory works to the maritime codes explicitly state 
that semi-dangerous goods do not confer a strict liability on the contracting shipper.102 In 
Norway, one needs to go back to the preparatory works to the 1938 revision of the maritime 
code to find any guidance. It is stated therein that goods which may cause damage without 
having dangerous characteristics, such as contraband and goods that are subject to embargo, 
are covered by the ordinary, fault-based, liability rule.103 In Denmark, the second paragraph 
of Section 257 was not introduced in the code until 1994. The preparatory works to the 1994 
DMC do not specify whether this shall be covered by the strict liability rule. As the report 
from the Danish Maritime Law Committee states that the provision is modelled on the 
                                                          
102 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 50; Committee Report on Carriage of Goods by Sea, Sweden (Stat-
ens offentliga utredningar SOU 1990:13) (n 43), 160.  
103 Innstilling av 7 mai 1936 fra den kgl. kommisjon til revisjon av Innstilling av 7 mai 1936 fra den kgl. 
kommisjon til revisjon av sjøfartsloven (Report from the Maritime Law Committee), 41.  
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Norwegian and Swedish codes, it may be assumed that the Danish law shall be interpreted 
in the same way.  
Where the strict liability of the contracting carrier was introduced in the Nordic maritime 
codes in the 1930’s, the notion of dangerous goods was based on the Hague understanding 
of “dangerous”.104 However, under the pre-Hague Nordic maritime codes, the “dangerous” 
concept had been wider, including also e.g. contraband.105 This broader meaning was upheld 
by adding a second paragraph to NMC 13:7 (§ 257). However, the construction of the strict 
liability rule in Section 97 (today’s 13:41/§ 291) under the 1930´s Nordic codes made it clear 
that it did not apply to semi-dangerous goods as referred to in the second paragraph. There 
was no link between the strict liability under Section 97 and the obligation to inform under 
Section 92, as it is today, but both Section 97 and Section 92.1, used the same expression 
“inflammable, explosive or other dangerous goods”. This must mean that only inherently 
dangerous goods pursuant to the first paragraph of today’s NMC 13:7 (§ 257) fall within the 
scope of the contracting shipper’s strict liability.  
It is however not easy to draw a distinct line between the two categories of goods under 
NMC 13:7 (§ 257), as “dangerous” for the purpose of NMC 13:7.1 (§ 257) is not expressly 
defined. As already concluded, “dangerous” in the context of NMC 13:7.1 (§ 257) shall be 
interpreted in line with the HR/HVR notion of “dangerous”. From the wording of the NMC 
13:7 (§ 257), it must be understood that the first paragraph comprises inherently dangerous 
goods, whereas under NMC 13:7.2 (§ 257.2) the danger is more linked to surrounding cir-
cumstances. The first paragraph uses the phrase “dangerous goods” where the other para-
graph refers to goods which “carriage may involve risks or essential inconvenience”, indi-
cating that the danger lies not with the goods itself. The second category is not only restricted 
to dangers, but also includes essential inconvenience that the carriage may cause. It is further 
stated that the risks and inconvenience shall be directed at persons, ship or cargo. According 
to the Finnish Bill and the Norwegian and Danish preparatory works106 the second category, 
i.e. semi-dangerous goods, includes inter alia contraband and goods leading to embargo.107 
                                                          
104 Grönfors, Sjölagens bestämmelser om godsbefordran (n 43), 102.  
105 ibid, 102; Peter Lødrup, ‘Befrakters og avlasters ansvar for farlig last’ (Nordic Maritime Law Seminar in 
Oslo 13-15 June 1966, Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law), 2-3.   
106 Innstilling av 7 mai 1936 fra den kgl. kommisjon til revisjon av Innstilling av 7 mai 1936 fra den kgl. 
kommisjon til revisjon av sjøfartsloven (Report from the Maritime Law Committee) (n 103), 39 f.; Committee 
Report 2 on Carriage of Goods by Sea, Denmark (n 35), 44 f.  
107 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 35.  
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The Swedish Government Bill (Swedish Bill), however, also mentions substances that may 
turn dangerous in combination with other circumstances, such as other products or increased 
temperatures, as examples of semi-dangerous goods.108 In my opinion, this statement is con-
fusing, as also the inherent danger of the most obvious “dangerous” cargo, such as explo-
sives, is generally triggered by some external factor, such as heat. In my interpretation of the 
Nordic preparatory materials, a cargo possessing dangerous properties, even though acti-
vated under special conditions only, may still be considered inherently dangerous for the 
purpose of NMC 13:7.1 (§ 257.1). Further support for this reasoning can be found in the 
Danish Committee Report 2, which states that the second paragraph may come into play 
when normally innocent cargo becomes dangerous in combination with certain other goods, 
insofar the first paragraph of § NMC 13:7 (§ 257) is not applicable.109  
Norwegian case law shows that in the factual assessment consideration will be taken to 
whether the particular cargo had inherent properties, which in combination with external 
factors, gave rise to the danger.  In ND 1941.353 Else (DCC) a cargo of steel shavings, which 
under ordinary circumstances was not considered dangerous, was deemed so for the purpose 
of the strict liability rule due to its propensity of self-heating. This specific characteristic was 
caused by a combination of remains of oil-contaminated cotton waste in the cargo and mois-
ture contents. In ND 1954.364 Florø (NCC) the court established the dangerousness of a 
cargo of ferro-silicon, even though it is not normally considered dangerous. The cargo had 
become humid before loading due to precipitation, causing the cargo to emit noxious gases, 
which in turn led to the death of two crew members.  
The distinction between situations where the danger is caused by the inherent properties of 
the goods and by external factors is however not clear-cut. Each case must be assessed on 
its own merits. In my opinion, it is reasonable to assume that the goods shall be considered 
dangerous for the purpose of NMC 13:7.1 (§ 257.1) and within the scope of the strict liability 
rule where the danger is principally linked the inherent properties of the goods.110 However, 
the preparatory works to the NMC makes clear that non-physically dangerous goods, such 
as contraband, is outside the scope of the strict liability rule.  
                                                          
108 Regeringens proposition om ny sjölag 1993/94:195 (Government Bill on a New Maritime Code, Sweden) 
(n 98), 219. 
109 Committee Report 2 on Carriage of Goods by Sea, Denmark (n 35), 45. 
110 Cf. discussion in Mats Segolson, ‘Damage from Goods in Sea Carriage: The Sender’s Liability against the 
Carrier and the Other Owners of Cargo on Board’ (Master's thesis, University of Uppsala 2001), 12.  
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As a comparison, at common law, the courts have included within the scope of the contract-
ing shipper’s strict liability not only inherently and physically dangerous goods but also sit-
uations where the danger is found in a) the surrounding circumstances and b) where the 
goods do not pose a physical danger to the ship or other cargo.111 In the reasoning of Mustill 
J. in the Athanasia Comninos112 the contractual description of the goods was tied to the as-
sessment of whether the goods was dangerous or not. Mustill J. argued that the contractual 
description of the goods shall be considered when determining what risks the carrier has 
accepted when agreeing to carry the goods. In that particular case, the court found against 
the carrier, as the carrier had agreed to carry a cargo of coal, which was generally known to 
be liable to emit methane gas, which in turn could cause an explosion. The same reasoning 
was applied in General Feeds Inc. v. Burnham Shipping Corporation (The Amphion)113, 
where a cargo of bagged fishmeal ignited during carriage. However, in that case the charterer 
was found liable for the damage as the carrier was not considered having accepted the inher-
ent risk of the cargo. This was due to the fact that the cargo was described in the contract as 
“anti-oxidant treated bagged fishmeal”, whereas it was in fact untreated. Bagged fishmeal, 
which has not been anti-oxidant treated is listed under Class 4.2. of the IMDG Code (Amend-
ment 38-16) due its ability to propensity to build up heat. In Mitchell, Cotts & Co. v. Steel 
Bros & Co. Ltd114 the court found that unlawful cargo, in this case a cargo requiring govern-
mental permission to be discharged at the destination, which may cause delay or seizure of 
the vessel, was considered on a par with dangerous goods for the purpose of the contracting 
shipper’s strict liability. The English common law definition of “dangerous” thus appears to 
be broad and include also goods that do not possess physically dangerous properties. How-
ever, under English case law relating to the HVR Article IV.6 the scope of application of the 
contracting shipper’s strict liability has in principle been limited to physically dangerous 
goods.115 There however seems to be room for including situations where there is an indirect 
risk of physical damage due to delay, e.g. because the cargo may cause the ship or cargoes 
                                                          
111 Girvin (n 23), 494.  
112 The Athanasia Comninos & Georges Chr. Lemos (The Athanasia Comninos) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 277. 
113 General Feeds Inc. v. Burnham Shipping Corporation (The Amphion) [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 101.  
114 Mitchell, Cotts & Co. v. Steel Bros & Co. Ltd [1916] 2 KB 610. 
115 Wafi N Abdul Hamid, ‘Loss or Damage from the Shipment of Goods, Rights and Liabilities of the Parties 
to the Maritime Adventure’ (Dissertation, University of Southampton 1996), 219. See also Effort Shipping 
Co. Ltd c. Linden Management S.A. and another (The Giannis NK) [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 171. In the Giannis 
NK a cargo of ground-nut infested by Khapra beetles was considered dangerous, as it was liable to cause 
damage to other cargo onboard. The infested cargo could not be discharged in the US and had to be dumped 
at sea together with other cargo onboard. In that case it was also ruled that the carrier was not precluded from 
invoking the common law remedy relating to non-physically dangerous goods.  
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to become subject to detention or expropriation.116 Furthermore, in English case law it has 
been submitted that the intrinsic properties of the goods is only one factor to consider when 
determining whether the goods are dangerous. The carrier’s knowledge of the characteristics 
of the goods, and the way he handles them in the light of this knowledge, is also relevant.117  
In comparison to the interpretation of the HR/HVR Article IV.6 under English law, the NMC 
definition of “dangerous” appears to be more limited. At least non-physically dangerous 
goods, such as contraband, are excluded from the scope of the strict liability. Where external 
factors alone has given rise to the danger, the contracting shipper will most likely not be 
strictly liable. The strict liability is thus primarily confined to physically and inherently dan-
gerous goods, even though account is also taken of situations where external factors have 
contributed to a lesser extent to the damage. It appears that the carrier’s knowledge of the 
goods’ characteristics is of no relevance to the dangerousness assessment, as under English 
law.  
3.4.3. The nature and degree of danger required 
The previous sub-chapter concluded that “dangerous goods” under NMC 13:7.1 (§ 257.1) 
and 13:41 (§ 291) shall be restricted to physically dangerous goods. This means that they 
shall be liable to cause physical damage to other property, people and environment.118 The 
ship does not necessarily have be at risk. This is shown by the judgment in ND 1954.364 
Florø (NCC). In the case a cargo of ferro-silicon was considered dangerous as it emitted 
noxious gases when becoming humid. The gases caused the death of two crew members. It 
was considered that the danger directed at human-beings only was sufficient to trigger the 
strict liability rule. This means that contamination by other goods onboard, considered in-
herently dangerous, also falls within the ambit of the contracting shipper’s strict liability.  
Does the strict liability rule require a certain degree of danger to exist? The NMC or their 
preparatory materials do not provide any guidance. This issue has however been discussed 
in both Nordic and international doctrine. Tetley has asserted that the danger must be of such 
a significance that it may lead to the capsizing of the ship.119 This is probably not the case 
under Nordic law. Firstly, this is not in line with the interpretation in ND 1954.364 Florø 
                                                          
116 ibid, 221. Abdul Hamid in this context gives Nobel’s Explosives v Jenkins [1896] 2 Q.B. 326 as an example.  
117 ibid, 221-222.  
118 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 35; Regeringens proposition om ny sjölag 1993/94:195 (Government 
Bill on a New Maritime Code, Sweden) (n 98), 219.  
119 William Tetley, Marine cargo claims (4. udg, Les Éditions Yvon Blais Inc 2008), 1118. 
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(NCC) as outlined above. Furthermore, in ND 1959.55 Grethe (NCC) the court found that a 
cargo of hot ore residues was dangerous even though the fire caused damage to the cargo 
holds only, without threating the safety of the ship. Another example is provided by ND 
1998.167 Leopold (DSC), where the contracting shipper was strictly liable for corrosion 
damage caused to the ship during transport of battery waste. With regards to the required 
degree of danger, Falkanger, Bull and Brautaset however suggests that there must be more 
than an everyday risk, meaning that the potential for damage must be significant.120  
3.5.Conclusions 
The main conclusion of Chapter 3 is that it is difficult to draw a distinct line between inher-
ently dangerous goods under NMC 13:7.1 (§ 257.1) and semi-dangerous goods under NMC 
13:7.2 (§ 257.2). Furthermore, the factual assessment entails an unpredictability for the con-
tracting shipper, as the dangerousness of goods is always assessed in hindsight. Even though 
the evaluation shall focus on the goods’ potential of causing damage at the time of shipment 
it must be admitted that courts may be inclined to consider a cargo dangerous where the 
damage has already occurred.121 This is problematic from the contracting shipper’s point of 
view, especially as a strict liability has been placed on his shoulder. The unpredictability 
issue will be developed further in sub-chapter 6.6 in connection with the critical study of the 
strict liability rule.  
4. The contracting shipper’s failure to inform and the carrier’s unawareness 
4.1.The relationship between the two preconditions for strict liability 
In the current wording of NMC 13:41 (§ 291), first paragraph, two preconditions must be 
met for the contracting shipper to be strictly liable for damage caused by goods classified as 
dangerous. The first condition is that the contracting shipper shall have failed to fulfill his 
obligation to inform the receiving carrier of the dangerous nature and necessary safety 
measures. Secondly, the receiving carrier shall not be otherwise aware of the dangerous na-
ture of the goods. The contracting shipper will not be strictly liable where only one condition 
is met. The strict liability is thus not a direct sanction for the contracting shipper’s breach of 
his obligation to inform. He can still be relieved of the strict liability where the carrier is 
otherwise aware of the dangerous nature when taking the goods in his charge.  
                                                          
120 Falkanger, Bull and Brautaset (n 43), 368.  
121 Segolson (n 110), 11-12. 
  
36 
 
It is impossible to keep the analyses of these preconditions for liability entirely separate. 
They are naturally intertwined, as the fulfillment of the contracting shipper’s obligation to 
inform and the carrier’s awareness will go hand in hand. In this chapter the meaning of the 
two preconditions will initially be discussed separately, and then an analysis of the combi-
nation of them will be undertaken.   
4.2.The contracting shipper’s obligation to inform 
4.2.1. An overview of the legal issues relating to the obligation to inform 
Pursuant to NMC 13:7 (§ 257), the contracting shipper is not only obliged to inform the 
carrier and sub-carrier on the dangerous properties of the goods, but also on necessary safety 
measures for the handling of the goods. Furthermore, the contracting shipper shall suitably 
mark the goods as dangerous. However, pursuant to the wording of NMC 13:41 (§ 291), first 
paragraph, the contracting shipper’s strict liability is however only triggered by his failure 
to inform. The suitable marking of the goods will however impact on the carrier’s awareness 
of the dangerous nature of the goods, and thus indirectly on the applicability of the contract-
ing shipper’s strict liability. The relevance of the marking of the goods as dangerous will be 
considered further in 4.2.5. With regards to the contracting shipper’s obligation to inform of 
necessary safety precautions, the discussion in 4.2.4. will reveal that the failure to fulfill that 
part of the obligation will not have any bearing on the applicability of the strict liability rule. 
Furthermore, the construction of the current liability model, where the strict liability is tied 
to both the contracting shipper’s failure to inform and the carrier’s unawareness of the dan-
gerous properties of the goods, may appear peculiar for several reasons. Firstly, one may ask 
whether the strict liability is triggered only where the contracting shipper has failed to inform 
of dangerous properties that he was aware or ought to be aware of? Or put another way, does 
NMC 13:7 (§ 275) and NMC 13:41 (§ 291) provide for a genuine obligation to inform or is 
it more of a risk of non-information that the contracting shipper carries? This will be dis-
cussed in sub-chapter 4.2.2. Secondly, sub-chapter 4.2.3. will analyze the whether the failure 
to inform as a precondition for strict liability has any independent function. In the end, the 
core precondition for strict liability to apply is that the receiving carrier must be unaware of 
the dangerous nature of the goods. And vice versa, where the receiving carrier is aware of 
the dangerous nature of the goods, either by means of information received from the con-
tracting shipper or otherwise, the strict liability rule will never apply.  
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4.2.2. Obligation to inform or risk of non-information? 
In the ordinary understanding of an “obligation to inform”, the duty is restricted to infor-
mation that the obliged person in fact possesses. It goes without saying that it is impossible 
to inform of anything that one is not aware of. However, NMC 13:7 (§ 257) does not specify 
that the obligation to inform shall be confined to dangerous characteristics of the goods that 
the contracting carrier is aware of. Neither do the preparatory materials.  
Given that NMC 13:41 (§ 291) imposes a strict liability on the contracting shipper where he 
has failed to fulfill his obligation to inform pursuant to 13:7 (§ 257), it is reasonable to as-
sume that the intention has been that no account shall be taken to what the contracting ship-
per knew or ought to have known of the goods’ properties. The distinctive feature of a strict 
liability is that liability will ensue even in the absence of negligence or intent. The liability 
is “objective” in the sense that subjective circumstances on the side of the liable party are 
not relevant. If NMC 13:7 (§ 257) would be interpreted so as to contain a genuine obligation 
to inform, the assessment of the applicability of the strict liability rule would require subjec-
tive considerations with regards to what the contracting shipper knew or ought to have 
known of the goods, and therefore could have informed of. In that case the liability would 
be more of a “control liability”.  
Reading 13:7 (§ 257) and 13:41 (§ 291) in conjunction, it must be concluded that the obli-
gation is more likely a “risk of non-information”122 carried by the contracting shipper, rather 
than a genuine obligation to inform. The contracting shipper will be strictly liable even where 
he did not know of the dangerous properties of the goods. In ND 1941.353 Else (DCC) it 
was also concluded by the court that NMC 13:41 (§ 291) does not take any account of the 
contracting shipper’s lack of knowledge of the nature of the goods. 
In my opinion, the expression “obligation to inform” is thus somewhat misleading, at least 
for the purpose of the strict liability rule under NMC 13:41 (§ 291). Despite this, the expres-
sion will be used further on in the thesis to describe the first precondition for strict liability 
under NMC 13:41 (§ 291). 
                                                          
122 The term “risk of non-information” is borrowed from Cecilia Grue, ‘Transport av farlig gods. Ansvar og 
særregler ved stykkgodstransport.’ [1998] MarIus 238, 60 f.  
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4.2.3. The failure to inform as a separate precondition for strict liability 
The first precondition for strict liability, i.e. the contracting shipper’s failure to inform of the 
dangerous nature of the goods, appears superfluous, as it will have no independent relevance 
where the carrier is otherwise aware of the dangerous nature of the goods. In that case the 
second precondition for strict liability will not be met, and the strict liability will not apply. 
Furthermore, where the contracting shipper has given the required information to the carrier, 
the carrier will naturally be aware of the dangerous nature of the goods. Then none of the 
preconditions for strict liability will apply. So in what situations does the non-fulfillment of 
the obligation to inform, as the first precondition for strict liability, have any independent 
function?  
The preparatory works to the NMC and the Hamburg Rules, on which NMC 13:41 (§ 291) 
is modelled, may help tracing the purpose of the current construction of the strict liability 
rule. Before the 1994 revision of the Nordic maritime codes, the contracting shipper’s strict 
liability for dangerous goods was not linked to his obligation to inform, only to the carrier’s 
unawareness.123 In my view, that construction made more sense. The preparatory materials 
however state that the link between the obligation to inform and the strict liability in the 
Hamburg Rules article 13.2 was established to cover sub-carrier situations.124 Given the way 
in which NMC 13:41 (§ 291) is construed,  I however question whether the separate precon-
dition in respect of the contracting shipper’s failure to inform brings any additional value to 
the strict liability rule. I would to the contrary assert it only results in more complexity in the 
application of the rule. In my view sub-carrier situations would be covered to the same ex-
tent, would the prime precondition for strict liability be the unawareness of the carrier to 
whom the goods are delivered.  
It has already been concluded that, pursuant to NMC 13:7 (§ 257), the contracting shipper is 
only obliged to inform the carrier to which he delivers the goods, be it the contracting carrier 
or a sub-carrier.125 When reading NMC 13:41 (§ 291) it must be assumed that the “the person 
who takes over the goods”, which pursuant to the second precondition for strict liability must 
not be otherwise aware of the dangerous nature of the goods, also refers to the carrier to 
                                                          
123 Section 97.2 (today NMC 13:41/§ 291) read: “If the damage is caused by inflammable, explosive or other 
dangerous goods, which have been loaded without the carrier having knowledge of such characteristics, the 
shipper is liable, even in the absence of fault or neglect”. 
124 Cf. Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Govern-
ment Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 50; NOU 1993:36 (n 43), 43; Regeringens proposition om ny 
sjölag 1993/94:195 (Government Bill on a New Maritime Code, Sweden) (n 98), 250.  
125 See discussion in Chapter 2.1.4. 
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whom the goods are first delivered.126 As both preconditions for strict liability refers to the 
same person, i.e. the receiving carrier, the core precondition for the contracting shipper’s 
strict liability will always be that the receiving carrier must not be aware of the dangerous-
ness of the goods. Where the contracting shipper has informed the receiving carrier, none of 
the preconditions for strict liability will be met. Where the contracting shipper has failed to 
inform the receiving carrier, but the latter is otherwise aware of the goods’ dangerous nature, 
strict liability will not apply either, as the second precondition is not met.127 Furthermore, 
where the preconditions for strict liability under NMC 13:41.1 (§ 291.1) are not fulfilled, 
strict liability will also be excluded towards carriers in the transport chain. The second par-
agraph of Section 41 (§ 291) will furthermore ensure that the (original) contracting shipper’s 
strict liability cannot be invoked by a later carrier who is aware of the dangerous nature of 
the goods, even though the preconditions of the first paragraph are fulfilled.128  
In the light of the above analysis, the precondition in respect of the contracting shipper’s 
failure to inform appears redundant. In my view, the second precondition on the unawareness 
of the receiving carrier, in combination with the second paragraph of NMC 13:41 (§ 291), 
would lead to the same end results, also in sub-carrier situations. The current construction of 
the strict liability is thus overly complex and not very successful. The criticism will be fur-
ther developed in sub-chapter 6.3. 
4.2.4. Relevance of the obligation to inform of safety precautions 
NMC 13:7 (§ 257) not only requires the contracting shipper to provide the carrier with in-
formation on the dangerous nature of the goods, but also on necessary safety precautions. 
However, given the wording of NMC 13:41 (§ 291), it is not fully clear whether failure to 
fulfil this part of the obligation to inform will trigger the strict liability of the contracting 
shipper. The first precondition for strict liability provides that the contracting shipper shall 
have handed over the goods to a carrier without informing him of the dangerous character 
of the goods and of the necessary safety precautions. The second precondition requires that 
the same carrier was not otherwise aware of the dangerous nature of the goods. There is 
consequently no full correlation between the two preconditions.  
                                                          
126 Cf. Grue (n 122), 70-71. 
127 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 50; Regeringens proposition om ny sjölag 1993/94:195 (Government 
Bill on a New Maritime Code, Sweden) (n 98), 250.  
128 NOU 1993:36 (n 43), 43.  
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The first question of interest is whether strict liability will ensue where the contracting ship-
per has informed of the dangerous nature of the goods, but not of the necessary precautionary 
measures. In a strict reading of the current wording, the first precondition for strict liability 
is met. However, this issue is also connected to the question of whether there is general duty 
of care of the carrier that requires him to make his own investigation on the necessary safety 
precautions where he is aware of the dangerous nature of the goods. This will be discussed 
in more detail in sub-chapter 4.3. At this stage it may however be concluded that, at least as 
a starting point and where there is causation between the failure to inform of necessary safety 
measures and the damage, the first precondition for strict liability has been met where the 
contracting shipper has only informed of the dangerous nature.  
In the above example, the second precondition for strict liability is however not met as the 
carrier will be aware of the dangerous nature of the goods where the contracting shipper has 
fulfilled that part of his obligation to inform. This means that a failure to provide information 
on the needed safety precautions is in practice without relevance for the applicability of the 
contracting shipper’s strict liability. So why has the obligation to inform of safety precau-
tions been included in NMC 13:41 (§ 291)? That is the other interesting question. From the 
exact wording of the section, the construction appears as an artificial sanction for the failure 
to inform of necessary safety precautions. This further highlights the difficulties in combin-
ing an obligation to inform and a strict liability, which will be discussed in sub-chapter 6.3. 
4.2.5. Sufficient notice of the dangerous nature 
The NMC do not contain any detailed requirements on the form or contents of the infor-
mation the contracting shipper shall provide the carrier with. Neither do the preparatory ma-
terials provide any guidance. It must therefore be assumed that the information can be given 
in any form. Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that the information shall be presented 
in such a way that an experienced and skillful carrier may appreciate the nature of the risk.129 
The contracting shipper thus carries the risk that the information has been received and un-
derstood by the carrier. 
With regards to the freedom of form, the contracting shipper’s obligation to suitably mark 
the goods as dangerous pursuant to NMC 13:7.1 (§ 257.1) may possibly be of relevance for 
the question whether the contracting shipper has fulfilled the obligation to inform. This issue 
                                                          
129 Julian Cooke, Voyage charters (Lloyd's shipping law library, 4th. ed. Informa Law from Routledge 2014), 
178.  
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will be considered further on in this sub-chapter, after having had a look at the suitability 
requirement and the standards for marking the goods under public safety regulations.  
The obligation to mark the goods as dangerous is an absolute one, compared to the previous 
maritime codes, where the marking should be done “where possible”.130 The section does 
not specify how the goods shall be marked in order to fulfill the “suitably” requirement. The 
legislator has deliberately chosen not to specify this, as the ways of marking the goods may 
vary depending on the type of goods.131 Where there are administrative rules on the marking 
of a specific goods, these shall be followed.132 The IMDG Code contains provisions on how 
packaged dangerous goods shall be marked and labelled. Pursuant to chapter 5.2 of the code 
the PSN and the UN Number shall be displayed on each package. There are also require-
ments regarding the use of specific danger labels for goods specifically listed in the Danger-
ous Goods List.133 At least a primary risk label, indicating the danger class, shall be attached 
to the package. However, sometimes also subsidiary risk labels shall be used to reflect fur-
ther risks inherent in the goods. Additional markings and symbols may be used to highlight 
certain precautions to be taken when handling the package, such as an umbrella indicating 
that the package is susceptible to water.134  
The purpose of marking and labelling the goods is logically to inform all persons involved 
in the carriage of the goods’ special nature and the handling required to minimize the danger 
that the goods pose. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the use of marks and label may 
in some situations be sufficient to fulfill the contracting shipper’s obligation to inform. How-
ever, according to the Norwegian preparatory works to the NMC, the contracting shipper’s 
obligation to inform under 13:7 (§ 257) is contractual and may be more extensive than the 
obligations imposed by public safety regulations, such as the IMDG Code.135 Firstly, the 
public safety regulations are not exhaustive in their listing of dangerous goods. Secondly, 
                                                          
130 The exact wording of Section 92.1 of the Finnish Maritime Code of 1939 (167/1939) read as follows: “Gods 
av lättantändlig, explosiv eller eljest farlig beskaffenhet skall vid avlämnandet, om möjligt, vara märkt som 
farligt; och give avlastaren de upplysningar, som äro erforderliga till förebyggande av skada.” 
131 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 35; Regeringens proposition om ny sjölag 1993/94:195 (Govern-
ment Bill on a New Maritime Code, Sweden) (n 98), 219; Committee Report 2 on Carriage of Goods by Sea, 
Denmark (n 35), 44.  
132 Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag till sjölag 1994 rd - RP 62/1994 (Finnish Government 
Bill on a Maritime Code, Finland) (n 7), 34-35;  
133 IMDG Code (amendment 38-16), 5.2.2. 
134 IMDG Code (amendment 38-16), 5.2.2.1.  
135 NOU 1993:36 (n 43), 25.  
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the dangerous nature of a particular cargo may be complex and a particular mark or label 
may not reflect all the nuances of its dangerousness.  
An interesting question is whether the contracting shipper has fulfilled his obligation to in-
form where he has made the carrier aware of that the goods are dangerous but not specified 
the type of danger that they carry with them. The use of the danger class labels, and poten-
tially also merely the provision of the PSN and/or UN Number, could be sufficient to specify 
the type of danger. The suitability requirement qualifies the contracting shipper’s obligation 
so that any marking of the goods will not necessarily be sufficient. “Suitably” must be inter-
preted as meaning that the goods shall be marked in a way so that the carrier will appreciate 
the type of danger inherent in the goods to be able to handle the goods safely. However, the 
extent of the contracting shipper’s obligation to inform must be balanced against the carrier’s 
potential obligations to make his own investigation on the goods. This will be further con-
sidered in sub-chapter 4.3.  
Pursuant to NMC 13:7 (§ 257), the contracting shipper shall provide the information in due 
time. This requirement is not explicitly repeated in NMC 13:41 (§ 291) and it may be asked 
whether the information must be given to the carrier in due time for the contracting shipper 
to escape strict liability. In the light of the wording of NMC 13:41 (§ 291), it may be assumed 
that the information shall be given at the latest when the goods are handed over to the car-
rier.136 Correspondingly, it shall be at this stage that the carrier shall be otherwise aware of 
the goods. This is a reasonable starting point, as the information will be of no avail to the 
carrier at a point of time where he can no longer take the required safety precautions. Pursu-
ant to the same reasoning, it would be reasonable to expect that the exclusion of strict liability 
could also require that information shall be given earlier, where early notification is required 
to prepare for the necessary safety measures.  
4.3.The carrier’s lack of knowledge 
4.3.1. Introduction 
The second precondition for strict liability under NMC 13:41.1 (§ 291.1) is that the receiving 
carrier must not be otherwise aware of the dangerous nature of the goods. The carrier can 
become otherwise aware by having noticed the dangerous properties of the goods, e.g. that 
the goods are emitting heat, or having received the information from someone else. Where 
                                                          
136 NMC 13:41 (§ 291) reads: “Where the contracting shipper has handed over the dangerous goods… without 
informing him”. The italicizing is my own.  
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the receiving carrier has actual knowledge of the dangerous nature, the strict liability will 
doubtlessly not come into play.   
However, an interesting question is whether carrier has any obligation to make his own in-
vestigations as to the nature of the goods, or whether he is at least expected to possess basic 
cargo knowledge. This sub-chapter 4.3. will therefore explore whether also the constructive 
knowledge of the carrier shall be considered when deciding whether the carrier was “other-
wise aware” of the dangerous nature of the goods.  
4.3.2. The carrier’s liability and general duty of care for the goods 
The carrier has a general duty of care in respect of the goods he is carrying. Pursuant to HVR 
article 3(2) the carrier “shall properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, 
and discharge the goods carried”. This duty has not been repeated in the Hamburg Rules or 
the NMC. However, it must be assumed that the duty is implicitly included in the Hamburg 
Rules article 5(1) and NMC 13:25 (§ 275), which set out the basis of the carrier’s cargo 
liability. Pursuant to NMC 13:25 (§ 275), the carrier is liable for damage caused during the 
time he has the goods in his charge, unless he can prove that the damage is not a result of 
fault or negligence on his side. There is thus a presumed liability, and the carrier must prove 
that he has been careful and prudent in the handling of the goods. The standard of care will 
vary depending on the circumstances of the individual carriage and must be assessed on the 
basis of the contract terms.137 Where the contract states that a particular cargo is to be carried, 
the carrier will be expected to possess knowledge of the cargo, or otherwise to acquaint 
himself with its properties. He shall at least consult a standard cargo handling manual.138 
The carrier thus has a general obligation to make own investigations as to the goods to be 
carried and their special handling requirements. This general duty is also manifested in the 
carrier’s obligation to examine the package of the goods to a reasonable degree to ensure 
that they are packed in such a way as not to be apt to cause damage.139 
The carrier will have a more extensive duty of care where he has taken on to carry goods 
which are sensitive or otherwise require special care.140 This is what Brækhus calls the rela-
tivity of the carrier’s duty of care. However, Brækhus also concludes that the duty of care 
must as a starting point be decided in the basis of what the carrier knows or is ought to know 
                                                          
137 Falkanger, Bull and Brautaset (n 43), 350.  
138 ibid, 350.  
139 Cf. NMC 13:6 (§ 256).  
140 Brækhus (n 101), 107.  
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of the particular goods.141 In order to determine what the carrier knows or is ought to know, 
a range of factors shall be considered, such as the information provided to the carrier by the 
contracting shipper, the carrier’s previous experience, the nature of the goods etc.142 The 
carrier has an extensive obligation to make investigations, but he cannot be expected to find 
out everything on the properties and requirements of the goods.  
As a starting point, the carrier cannot be expected to possess knowledge of special cargo, i.e. 
of an uncommon nature and with special requirements. This is made clear by both NMC 
13:7 (§ 257) on dangerous goods and 13:8 (§ 258) on goods requiring special care. Both 
provisions require the contracting shipper to notify the carrier of the special nature and nec-
essary handling requirements of the goods. Where the contracting shipper has not notified 
the carrier pursuant to NMC 13:7 (§ 257) or 13:8 (§ 258), the carrier will consequently as-
sume the goods do not require any special handling.  
The liability rule contained in NMC 13:25 (§ 275) is general, applying to the carriage of all 
kinds of goods. In the carriage of dangerous cargo, the duty of care required by the carrier 
must thus be decided on the basis of the information he had or ought to have had of the 
particular goods.  Sometimes information on the type of goods will be sufficient to make the 
carrier aware of their dangerous nature and handling requirements143, e.g. in respect of typ-
ically dangerous goods, such as certain types of explosives. In other cases, the name of the 
goods may not at all alert the carrier of its dangerous nature. Even though the carrier has a 
duty to consult general cargo manuals, including the IMDG Code, the carrier must have 
sufficient information on the goods to be able to check the goods’ name and/or properties 
against the Dangerous Goods List of the code. The PSN, the UN Number and/or a label may 
provide the proper guidance to ascertain whether the goods are listed as dangerous. Further-
more, in cases where a particular cargo has characteristics that are not typical for that kind 
of goods, the carrier cannot be expected to possess knowledge of the special handling re-
quirements. Unless the contracting shipper has provided the carrier with specific information 
on the consignment, the carrier will only be obliged to exercise “normal” duty of care with 
regards to the ordinary properties of such goods. The case ND 1954.377 Florentine (NCC) 
provides useful guidelines for the determination of the standard of care in respect of special 
goods. 
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In ND 1954.377 the carrier was found free of liability, i.e. because he was not expected to possess 
knowledge of the treacherous properties of the cargo of copper concentrate and neither obliged to un-
dertake further investigations on the nature of the goods. The master had been aware of previous inci-
dents involving ships carrying copper concentrate along the same route, however, there were no offi-
cial reports on the fact that the cargo, due to its water content, could liquify during carriage and lead to 
the listing of the vessel. Only warnings had been issued as to the general dangerous nature of the 
goods and that bulkheads shall be used in the cargo holds. Bulkheads had been used in the particular 
case and the master had consulted the shipper as to the proper handling of the goods. The court thus 
considered that the carrier had fulfilled his duty of care. 
To sum up the discussion, it may be concluded that the standard of care required by the 
carrier when carrying dangerous goods will depend on the knowledge he has or is ought to 
have on the properties of the particular goods. Where he has no information, and no grounds 
for suspecting, that the goods require special handling, only ordinary care is required. How-
ever, every indication of the goods’ special nature will increase the requirements on his own 
activity.  
4.3.3. Is the carrier’s constructive knowledge relevant? 
Given the relevance of the obligation to make investigations for the purpose of the carrier’s 
liability under NMC 13:25 (§ 275), also in respect of the carriage of dangerous goods, it 
would be reasonable to assume that the carrier’s constructive knowledge, i.e. knowledge that 
the carrier is ought to have, would be of relevance also for the non-application of the con-
tracting shipper’s strict liability. However, the construction of the strict liability rule suggests 
that only the actual knowledge of the carrier is to be considered. The strict liability does not 
apply where the contracting shipper he has informed the carrier of the dangerous nature of 
the goods. In that situation, the carrier will possess actual knowledge. The second exemption 
from strict liability is where the carrier “otherwise has knowledge” of the dangerous nature. 
In my view, “otherwise has knowledge” appears to be referring back to the actual knowledge 
that the carrier would have had, would the contracting shipper have fulfilled his obligation 
to inform.  
Neither do the NMC nor the preparatory works mention information that the receiving car-
rier is ought to have. The preparatory works consistently refer to knowledge that the carrier 
otherwise has. This shall be compared to the requirements as to the carrier’s knowledge in 
respect of misleading or incorrect information entered on the bill of lading, where it is ex-
pressly referred to what the carrier knew or ought to know.144  This would also suggest that 
actual knowledge is required for the strict liability not to apply. However, it must be pointed 
out that the Nordic courts are not bound by the exact wording of the codes nor the intention 
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of the lawgiver as expressed in the preparatory works.145 It is therefore relevant to take a 
look at relevant case law on the topic.  
In the case ND 1954.364 Florø (NCC) two crew members died and the vessel was delayed due to the 
emission of noxious gases from a cargo of ferro-silicon. The cargo had been standing uncovered on the 
quay for several days before the loading and become wet. Ferro-silicon is not inherently dangerous but 
may emit gases when coming in contact with humidity or water. The court established that the particular 
cargo was dangerous, and that the shipper was strictly liable pursuant to Section 97, second paragraph, 
of the Norwegian Maritime Code in force at the time.146 Despite this, the court further considered 
whether the carrier had been negligent in not making sufficient investigations as to the nature of the 
goods. The background for this consideration was probably allegations from the contracting shipper that 
the liability should be divided as the carrier had contributed to the damage by not having made proper 
investigations despite suspicions as to the dangerousness of the goods. The court however established 
that it was unnecessary to consider the potential negligence of the carrier, as only the carrier’s 
knowledge of the dangerous nature can exempt the contracting shipper from strict liability.  
In ND 1941.353 Else (DCC) the court reasoned that a cargo of steel shavings was dangerous on the 
basis of a factual assessment of the properties of the goods. It further established that the application of 
Section 97.2 of the Danish Maritime Code of 1892 required absence of knowledge on the part of the 
carrier. The carrier asserted that he had not noticed anything special features with the goods during the 
loading. The loading had been swift, as a grab had been used. The carrier had carried similar goods 
previously but not experienced any problems with self-heating.  The shipper was found strictly liable.  
In both cases, the court established that it was unnecessary to consider whether the carrier 
had been negligent in making own investigations, as only the carrier’s knowledge exempts 
the contracting shipper from strict liability. This indicates that it is only the actual knowledge 
of the carrier that is relevant. If the intention would be to also let constructive knowledge 
influence on the applicability of the strict liability rule, this would indirectly require the car-
rier to undertake investigations, at least where there were grounds for suspecting that the 
goods are dangerous. The case ND 1959.55 Grethe (NCC) may shed some further light on 
this issue.  
In ND 1959.55 Grethe (NCC) a cargo of hot ore residues had caused damage to the ship. The cargo was 
considered dangerous for the purpose of Section 92, first paragraph, of the previous Norwegian code on 
the basis of a factual assessment. The cargo had at the time of loading been very warm and even con-
tained glowing particles. The shipper was found liable under Section 97, however, there was also found 
considerable negligence on the part of the carrier and the court therefore ordered the shipper to com-
pensate only one third of the carrier’s losses. 
What is remarkable with the Grethe case is that the court did not expressly consider the issue 
whether the carrier had been aware of the dangerous nature of the goods. It was only estab-
lished that the vessel’s master had noticed the glowing particles and therefore should have 
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taken further measures to investigate the nature of the goods and necessary safety precau-
tions. Furthermore, the court found that there was negligence on both sides and therefore 
reduced the liability of the shipper. It is not clear from the judgment whether the shipper was 
found liable under the first or second paragraph of Section 97, i.e. pursuant to the ordinary 
fault-based liability or the strict liability in respect of dangerous goods, and it is therefore 
difficult to draw any reliable conclusions. 
One interpretation of the judgment may be that the court found that the strict liability under 
the second paragraph did not apply as the carrier was considered being “aware” of the dan-
gerous nature of the goods, and therefore applied the ordinary liability under Section 97.1. 
However, this interpretation presupposes that also the constructive knowledge of the carrier 
is relevant for the strict liability rule. The master had admitted that he had noted glowing 
particles in the cargo but asserted that he was otherwise unfamiliar with the properties of 
that kind of goods and therefore, after having consulted the dock personnel, anticipated that 
the conditions were normal. There was no actual knowledge on the part of the carrier, only 
suspicions. According to the judgment, this would have required him to take further actions 
as a prudent shipowner.  
However, an alternative, and in my opinion more correct, interpretation of the court ruling 
is that the court found that the contracting shipper could be held liable under both paragraphs 
of Section 97, and then proceeded to the conclusion that the liability should be reduced due 
to negligence on the part of the carrier. The issue of whether the contracting shipper’s strict 
liability may be reduced due to negligence on the part of the carrier requires further analysis 
and will be considered in Chapter 5. It may however already at this point be admitted that 
there does not seem to be any obstacle for adjusting the damage payable where there is con-
tributory negligence on the part of the carrier. Tiberg argues along the same lines in his 
reflections on the Grethe case.147  
There seems to be a general understand in the Nordic scholarship that NMC 13:41 (§ 291) 
refers only to the actual knowledge of the carrier148, and on the basis of the above analysis I 
find no reasons to challenge the predominant view. However, there are problems inherent in 
this interpretation. These are mainly connected to the carrier’s ordinary duty of care and 
                                                          
147 Hugo Tiberg, ‘Om ansvar för skada på fartyg i kontraktsförhållande’ [1962] Handelshögskolan i Göteborg, 
Skrifter 1962:5, 30. 
148 Honka, ‘Introduction’ (n 45), 157; Falkanger, Bull and Brautaset (n 43), 368; Tiberg, ‘Legal Survey’ (n 97), 
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transport liability and that the contributory negligence will have the same effect as if con-
structive knowledge would be relevant for the no-application of the strict liability rule. This 
will be discussed further in sub-chapter 6.5.  
4.3.4. Whose knowledge? 
As a final remark in respect of the precondition concerning the carrier’s unawareness, con-
sideration shall be made to the group of people that the carrier shall be identified with. In a 
majority of cases the carrier will be a legal entity and not an individual person. In order to 
establish whether the second precondition for strict liability is met, it is necessary to consider 
which persons within the sphere of the carrier shall possess the relevant knowledge. Neither 
the NMC nor the Hamburg Rules provide any guidance. However, HVR article 4(6) provides 
that a prerequisite for strict liability is that the dangerous goods shall have been shipped 
without “the carrier, master or agent of the carrier” having consented thereto with knowledge 
of their nature and character. The strict liability must thus be interpreted so as not to apply 
where any of these persons had actual knowledge of the goods’ dangerous nature. The crucial 
point must in my view be that the person possessing knowledge must have the authority to 
initiate the necessary precautionary measures. 
5. Final remarks on the allocation of liability 
The above conclusion that only the actual knowledge of the carrier will invalidate contract-
ing shipper’s strict liability means that no account is taken to whether the carrier had reasons 
to suspect the cargo was dangerous. The contracting shipper will consequently be strictly 
liable even where he had no knowledge of the dangerous nature of the cargo whatsoever, but 
the carrier was in a better position of observing the dangerous nature of the goods. As Mustill 
J. put it in the Athanasia Comninos case, the disregard of the carrier’s constructive 
knowledge will result in a “premium in ignorance”.149 The prevailing interpretation of the 
strict liability rule confers that the carrier is, at least partly, relieved of his ordinary duty of 
care in relation to the goods. There appears to exist a clear imbalance between the interests 
of the contracting shipper and the carrier. Another criticism of the disregard of the carrier’s 
constructive knowledge, is that it will be difficult for the contracting shipper to prove the 
existence of actual knowledge on the part of the carrier. What furthermore enhances the 
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imbalance of interests, is that the definition of “dangerous goods” is vague and subject to a 
case-by-case assessment in hindsight, where the damage has already occurred.  
It shall be admitted that the consequences of the disregard of the carrier’s constructive 
knowledge for the determination of the contracting shipper’s strict liability may be relieved 
at the stage when the recoverable losses are to be calculated. Both the requirement as to 
causality between the damaging act and the loss and the possibility of adjusting the damage 
due to contributory negligence may reduce the contracting shipper’s liability where the car-
rier has been negligent in acquainting himself with the nature of the goods. Where the carrier 
could have revealed the special nature of the goods by making proper investigations, it 
should in my opinion be possible to adopt the principle on contributory negligence as ex-
pressed in the Finnish Tort Liability Act 6:1 to reasonably allocate the losses between the 
parties.150 In the same way as the carrier’s liability may be reduced under NMC 13:25.3 (§ 
275.3) where some other cause has contributed to the loss, shall it be possible to adjust the 
contracting carrier’s liability. It may be difficult to find a reasonable allocation of the losses 
given the fact that the negligence of the parties cannot be balanced against each other, as the 
contracting shipper is liable regardless of fault. This is however not a strong enough reason 
for excluding the possibility of considering contributory negligence on the part of the suf-
fering party when calculating the compensation.  
The Grethe case151, as referred to in sub-chapter 4.3.3., in my opinion supports the above 
reasoning. In that case the court ordered the contracting shipper to cover only one third of 
the carrier’s losses as the master had noticed that the cargo contained glowing particles dur-
ing loading. The cargo was considered dangerous, but it was not elucidated whether the court 
applied a strict or fault-based liability when holding the contracting shipper liable. If the 
court considered strict liability to be excluded, that must have been with reference to the 
carrier’s constructive knowledge of the goods’ dangerous nature.  However, in my under-
standing of the judgment, the court considered the negligence of the carrier for the purpose 
of the principle of contributory negligence.  
Some may argue that the principle of contributory negligence neutralizes the effect of the 
disregard of the carrier’s constructive knowledge and the imbalance of interest. However, in 
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my view, there is a crucial difference in considering what the carrier was ought to know 
already when assessing the applicability of the strict liability rule or only at the stage when 
the amount of damages is to be calculated. Where the carrier’s negligence is of relevance 
only at the second stage, the contracting shipper has already been found strictly liable and 
the damages cannot be eliminated in full. 
Part II The dangerous goods liability of the contracting shipper – de lege ferenda 
6. The appropriateness of the current liability construction 
6.1.Introduction 
In this chapter the strict liability rule will be scrutinized in more detail, both from a legal-
technical and functional point of view. The study has already pointed out several shortcom-
ings in the current strict liability construction. Furthermore, it may be asked whether the 
current liability scheme confers a proper allocation of risks between the parties and whether 
it represents the most effective way in minimizing the total costs for damage caused by dan-
gerous goods. Answering the last issue requires considerations from a law and economics 
point of view.  
The chapter will deal with each identified problem of the current strict liability rule sepa-
rately in sub-chapters 6.2 to 6.6. In sub-chapter 6.7. the appropriateness of placing a strict 
liability on the contracting shipper will be analyzed from several perspectives, among them 
general theories on the functions of a strict liability and aspects on channeling and insurance 
of liability. This critical study of the current liability construction, together with a compari-
son with the liability model adopted in the RR, will constitute the platform for my proposal 
for a new, better suited, liability model, which will be presented in Chapter 7.  
6.2.The problematic construction in the light of the burden of proof 
One main criticism of the current liability construction is the wording of NMC 13:41 (§ 291). 
The current construction has been justified by reference to e.g. consideration of sub-carrier 
situations. However, as was concluded in sub-chapter 4.2.3., this argument is flawed. In my 
view, the current construction is overly complex and makes the rule difficult to apply. One 
main issue is that the section sets out a strict liability which preconditions are expressed in 
the negative, i.e. that the strict liability shall apply where the contracting shipper has not 
informed of the dangerous nature and the carrier is not otherwise aware of it. The starting 
point is thus that the contracting shipper is strictly liable only when those two negative 
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conditions are met. In accordance with ordinary principles on burden of proof, it is the car-
rier, asserting that the contracting shipper is strictly liable, who shall prove that the goods 
are dangerous and that he did not possess actual knowledge of the nature of the goods. How-
ever, given the fact that the preconditions for strict liability are expressed in the negative, 
and that it is difficult to present evidence of something that has not happened, the burden of 
proof will probably quite easily shift to the contracting shipper who then needs to prove the 
existence of actual knowledge on the carrier’s side.   
In my opinion, a more appropriate and more easily applicable model would be to set strict 
liability as the starting point where it has been proven that the goods handed over to the 
carrier were dangerous. The strict liability would be linked to one or two exceptions, i.e. that 
a carrier who has taken the goods in his charge with knowledge of their dangerous character 
cannot invoke the strict liability, and possibly also that the contracting shipper cannot be 
held strictly liable where he can prove that he has given the required information to the 
receiving carrier. The adoption of the second exemption is connected to the discussion in 
sub-chapter 6.3. on the role of the obligation to inform as a precondition for strict liability 
and the conclusions drawn there. Under the proposed construction of the strict liability rule, 
the burden of proof would be slightly shifted to the contracting shipper, however, it would 
make the application of the rule easier.  
6.3.The questionable link between the obligation to inform and the strict liability 
Subchapter 4.2.3. raised the question whether the contracting shipper’s failure to inform as 
a precondition for strict liability has any independent function. The fulfillment of the obli-
gation to inform will naturally make the receiving carrier aware of the dangerous nature of 
the goods, and the strict liability rule will consequently be inapplicable. Neither will the strict 
liability apply where the contracting shipper has failed to inform the receiving carrier, but 
the latter is otherwise aware of the dangerous nature. The application of the strict liability 
thus in the end hinges on the receiving carrier’s unawareness of the dangerousness of the 
cargo. In my opinion, the combination of two preconditions for strict liability, which are to 
a large extent interdependent, makes the application of the rule overly complex, and is not 
at all necessitated by sub-carrier considerations. A more appropriate solution would there-
fore be to return to the solution found in the NMC prior to the 1994 revision, i.e. where the 
prime precondition for strict liability was the carrier’s unawareness of the dangerous nature 
of the goods.  
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It must however be admitted that there are other interpretations of the current strict liability 
rule. One of them is provided by Grue. She argues that the contracting shipper could be 
strictly liable to a later carrier where he has failed to inform the receiving carrier, even though 
the receiving carrier is otherwise aware of the dangerous nature of the goods. She maintains 
that the Norwegian maritime law committee report would support this interpretation where 
the later carrier is not aware of the dangerous nature of the goods.152 I find her conclusion 
poorly substantiated and in contradiction with the exact wording of the NMC 13:41.1 (§ 
291.1) and the preparatory materials153. However, in Grue’s reasoning, the non-fulfillment 
of the obligation to inform as a separate precondition for strict liability would make more 
sense. Furthermore, in the light of her interpretation, it may also de lege ferenda be ques-
tioned whether it is reasonable that the contracting shipper may escape strict liability as 
against later carriers where he has neglected his obligation to inform, but the receiving carrier 
is otherwise aware of the dangerous nature of the goods. There are several aspects that needs 
to be considered in this context.  
First and foremost, the rationale of the strict liability must be understood as to ensuring that 
the carrier shall have the required knowledge to carry the goods safely and to decide whether 
he is at all willing to take on the risk. From that point of view, the contracting shipper’s 
failure to inform will been neutralized where the receiving carrier is “otherwise” aware of 
the dangerous nature. The receiving carrier can control the risk the goods carry with them 
further down the transport chain by informing the following carrier. There is an equivalent 
situation where the contracting shipper has notified the receiving carrier, but where the first 
carrier has not forwarded this information to the following carrier. The question is whether 
these two situations should be approached differently. Shall the contracting shipper be held 
liable for all failures to inform along the transport chain, where he has not given the required 
information in the first place? Where one of the carriers has been “otherwise” aware of the 
dangerous nature of the goods, the chain of causation between the contracting shipper’s 
omission and the damage has in fact been broken. In my view, the liability must lie with the 
carrier who is otherwise aware of goods’ nature and thus shall ensure that also the following 
carrier receives the relevant information. This would support the solution proposed above in 
respect of a strict liability rule based on the receiving carrier’s unawareness only.  
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However, it must be admitted that there is a flaw in the proposed, and in the current, liability 
model from the carrier’s point of view. A carrier who has suffered a loss due to the previous 
carrier’s failure to provide information on the dangerous nature of the goods will probably 
have to claim in tort, unless it may be considered existing a contracting shipper-carrier rela-
tionship between the two carriers. The liability of the previous carrier will then be fault-
based and the suffering carrier will have poorer chances of success. Grue’s interpretation 
and solution would offer a way of channeling the liability to the contracting shipper where 
he has neglected his obligation to inform in the first place. However, in my opinion, this 
would not provide any incentives for the carriers further down the transport chain to forward 
information that he is otherwise aware of, as a later carrier would be more likely to go against 
the contracting shipper, where fault does not have to be proven. In my view, the problem of 
channeling the strict liability along the chain of carrier is in the end more dependent on the 
fact that the dangerous goods liability is placed on the contracting shipper rather than the 
shipper. This flaw should therefore not be considered an obstacle for abolishing the failure 
to inform as a separate precondition for strict liability.  
6.4.The problem of channeling strict liability along the chain of carriers 
As concluded above, under the current construction, the strict liability rule under NMC 13:41 
(§ 291) might not be applicable as between two carriers in the transport chain, as the previous 
carrier is considered a shipper154 of the goods, but not necessarily a contracting shipper. The 
contracting party of the later carrier may be someone else, e.g. a carrier who has taken on 
the whole transport and then engaged sub-carriers for the performance of all or parts of it. 
This head carrier will, in his capacity as contracting shipper against his sub-carriers, be 
obliged to inform only the carrier to whom he physically hands over the goods. The problem 
is further accentuated by the fact that the head carrier does not necessarily perform any part 
of the carriage himself. In the chain of carriers, it is thus possible, or even probable, that the 
strict liability will not be applicable to a shipper-carrier, who failed to forward the infor-
mation on the dangerous nature of the goods. The claim has then to be made pursuant to 
ordinary tort rules and fault or negligence must be proven. One may ask whether this is an 
appropriate solution in a strict liability model. The problem could be overcome by returning 
to placing the strict liability on the shipper instead of the contracting shipper.155 The shipper 
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is the person who physically delivers the goods for carriage and would thus include the ship-
per who delivers the goods to the first carrier and also all carriers in the transport chain. The 
issue could also be rectified by obliging the contracting shipper to inform the (contracting) 
carrier of the dangerous nature of the goods. Where a head carrier has engaged sub-carriers 
to perform the carriage he would then, in his capacity as contracting shipper towards them, 
be obliged to provide them with the relevant information. I believe the second alternative 
would be more feasible, as obliging the contracting shipper to inform the contracting carrier 
instead of, or in addition to, the receiving carrier can hardly have any detrimental effects, 
whereas changing the liable person may have unexpected consequences.  
6.5.The disregard of the carrier’s constructive knowledge 
In Chapter 5 it was concluded that the current liability construction in Nordic law confers an 
imbalance of the interests of the contracting shipper and the carrier, as the contracting ship-
per will be strictly liable even where the carrier could have observed the dangerous nature 
of the goods by making proper investigations. Given the fact that the carrier must possess 
actual knowledge for the strict liability rule not to apply, the carrier’s ordinary duty of care, 
including the obligation to investigate the properties and special handling requirements of 
the goods, does not seem to apply in the carriage of dangerous goods. This is particularly 
problematic in situations where both the dangerous goods and other property has been dam-
aged. The issues shall be illustrated by way of an example:  
Cargo X is being shipped. The contracting shipper has bought the goods from a manufacturer and ac-
cording to the delivery terms the buyer shall arrange for the sea carriage. The contracting shipper has 
no previous experience of cargo X, as it is a fairly new and rare substance. As he is the buyer, he does 
not physically examine the consignment in question before shipment at the port of loading. The mas-
ter of the vessel has however carried similar goods previously and has noticed that the cargo is liable 
to liquify during carriage in certain conditions. He has noted that the water content of the goods will 
affect its inclination of turning liquid. There are however no officially reported incidents with this 
kind of goods. Despite having this knowledge, the carrier does not take any measures to investigate 
the water content of the goods or to construct bulkheads in the cargo holds. During the carriage, the 
cargo turns liquid during hard, however not extreme, weather and causes the sinking of the vessel. The 
vessel and all cargo onboard are lost.  
This example is to some extent similar to the course of events in ND 1954.377 Florentine 
(NCC). However, in the Florentine case, the master did not have any personal experience of 
the carriage of the particular cargo, and he was considered having undertaken sufficient in-
vestigations as to the special handling requirements of the goods. In that case the carrier was 
found free of liability for damage caused to the goods onboard. In the example case, the 
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cargo would probably be considered dangerous pursuant to NMC 13:41 (§ 291), even though 
it is not yet listed as dangerous in any public safety regulations. The contracting shipper will 
be strictly liable to the carrier, as the carrier did not have actual knowledge of the dangerous 
properties of the cargo. It does not matter that the carrier could have found out the cargo’s 
water content and taken safety precautions. However, what is interesting, if the contracting 
shipper was to direct a claim against the carrier for the loss of his (dangerous) goods, it is 
likely that the carrier would be considered liable under NMC 13:25 (§ 275) as he did not 
fulfill his duty of care. The end result must be some sort of allocation of liability between 
the parties.156 Under the current liability model, this may be done at the point when the com-
pensable losses are to be calculated. However, as the preconditions for strict liability are met, 
it is no longer possible for the contracting shipper to fully escape liability. ND 1959.55 
Grethe (NCC) also provides an example of the artificial allocation of losses the current strict 
liability rule forces the Nordic courts into. Due to insufficient motives, it is difficult to draw 
reliable conclusions as to the court’s reasoning in the case, but it must be assumed that court 
was applying the principle of contributory negligence rather than considering the carrier’s 
constructive knowledge when finding that the contracting shipper was obliged to cover only 
one third of the carrier’s losses. Accordingly, the court found that the preconditions for the 
contracting shipper’s strict liability were met but considered the carrier had contributed to 
the greater part of the damage by not having carried out proper investigations. I take this 
judgment as an indication that the court considered the carrier being principally liable for 
the incident but had no other option than to apply the strict liability rule and try to reduce its 
unfair risk allocation by reducing the compensable loss by two thirds.  
The above examples highlight the complexity in disregarding the carrier’s constructive 
knowledge in the application of the strict liability rule. There is no correlation between the 
preconditions for liabilities of the contracting shipper and of the carrier when dangerous 
goods are being carried. An easy way to solve this issue, would be to take the constructive 
knowledge of the carrier into account already in the assessment of the applicability of the 
strict liability. This would require an explicit reference in NMC 13:41.1 (§ 291.1) to infor-
mation the carrier is ought to have. The solution would change the end result in situations as 
the one described in the example case, where the strict liability rule would then not apply. 
The contracting shipper’s liability would then be decided in the basis of the ordinary, fault-
based, liability rule contained in NMC 13:40 (§ 290). In the example case, the contracting 
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shipper must be considered having acted prudently and the carrier would most likely have 
to carry the losses pursuant to NMC 13:25 (§ 275).  I believe this would be a fair solution, 
given the fact that the carrier had grounds for suspecting the goods could be dangerous. 
Neither in the situations similar to the Grethe case would the strict liability rule apply, but 
as there was negligence on both sides there would be a distribution of the losses between the 
parties along the same lines as under the current liability construction. Support for a strict 
liability construction which takes account of the carrier’s constructive knowledge is also 
found in the understanding of the HVR article 4(6) under English law. In the Athanasia 
Comninos judgment157, it was held that the contracting shipper was not strictly liable where 
the carrier was ought to possess knowledge of the dangerous properties of the goods.158  
6.6.The vague definition of “dangerous” 
It has already been concluded that the NMC contain no definition of “dangerous goods”, but 
that public safety regulations may be consulted to find some guidance. However, in the end 
a factual assessment of the nature of the particular goods must always be undertaken.159 In 
making that assessment, a distinction between “dangerous” goods and other injurious goods 
must be made. Under Nordic law, “dangerous goods” refers to goods that are primarily in-
herently and physically dangerous, i.e. which by its inherent characteristics are liable to 
cause physical damage.160 Damage cause by other goods, e.g. contraband or goods which 
are not inherently dangerous, shall be governed by the fault-based rule under NMC 13:40 (§ 
290). 
The vague definition of “dangerous goods”, and the fact that the factual assessment of the 
dangerous nature of the goods is carried out in hindsight, confers a great unpredictability for 
the contracting shipper. In my opinion, the proper and fair functioning of the strict liability 
model would require a factual assessment which is always based on what could have been 
anticipated as to the good’s potential of causing damage before the carriage. Some sort of 
objective foreseeability in the “dangerousness” assessment shall be required. The assessment 
must thus be based on what a prudent contracting shipper was ought to have understood in 
relation to the nature of the goods at the time of shipment.  
                                                          
157 The Athanasia Comninos & Georges Chr. Lemos (The Athanasia Comninos) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 277. 
158 Cooke (n 129), 1133.  
159 Cf. Chapter 3.4.  
160 Cf. sub-chapters 3.4.2. and 3.4.3. 
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The current solution must be considered unsatisfactory given the extensive liability that fol-
lows where the goods are considered “dangerous”.  A strict liability placed on the shoulders 
of the contracting shipper would be easier to accept in case the definition of “dangerous 
goods” was more predictable. Or the other way around; a vague definition of “dangerous” 
would be more acceptable where the contracting shipper’s liability would be fault-based. 
However, in the latter case it would no longer be necessary to define “dangerous”, as all 
damage from goods would fit into the ordinary liability rule contained in NMC 13:40 (§ 
290). There would be no need to distinguish between dangerous goods and other injurious 
goods.  
If the strict liability model is to be upheld, the assessment of the dangerousness of the goods 
shall be more predictable. One solution would be to confine “dangerous” to goods that are 
listed in public safety regulation, primarily the IMDG Code. This would cover most goods 
that would be considered dangerous under the current rule, however it would not be capable 
of encompassing new substances or goods that exhibit dangerous properties under special 
conditions only. However, this could be a fair compromise of the interests of the parties. 
Where an unlisted substance is shipped, the contracting shipper could still be held liable 
under NMC 13:40 (§ 290) where he ought to have understood the goods required special 
handling.   
In Nordic doctrine, at least Honka has argued that the strict liability rule shall be extended 
to cover also non-physically dangerous goods, such as contraband, and semi-dangerous 
goods.161 This would bring the Nordic law closer to the English solution, which focus more 
on dangerous situations rather than “dangerous goods”.162 Given the difficulty of drawing a 
borderline between dangerous and semi-dangerous goods, I see the benefit of such a reason-
ing. However, in my opinion, there is a risk that the extension of the scope of the contracting 
shipper’s strict liability to “dangerous situations” would make the strict liability rule even 
more unpredictable for the contracting shipper.  
                                                          
161 Honka, ‘New Carriage of Goods by Sea - The Nordic Approach’ (n 11), 159.  
162 Cf. sub-chapter 3.4.2. 
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6.7.Shall the contracting shipper’s liability be strict? 
6.7.1. Introduction 
The contracting shipper’s strict liability has been justified by reference to that he is in a better 
position to know the goods he is shipping.163 In my view, a more nuanced approach is re-
quired. I would therefore extract the analysis so far into three distinctive situations which 
may provide useful insights in respect of the appropriateness of the contracting shipper’s 
strict liability. The situations are the following: 
1. Damage is caused by goods, the properties of which the contracting shipper has good 
chances of knowing or getting acquainted with, e.g. commonly shipped goods and 
substances listed in public safety regulations. 
2. Situations where the carrier is in the same, or better, position as the contracting ship-
per to know or detect the dangerous properties of the goods, e.g. the example outlined 
in sub-chapter 6.5. and ND 1959.55 Grethe (NCC). 
3. Situations where neither the carrier nor the contracting shipper knew, or could have 
known, the dangerous properties of the goods.  
In the first situation, a strict liability imposed on the contracting shipper appears rather un-
controversial. In the second situation, a strict liability rule could also be accepted, provided 
it takes the constructive knowledge of the carrier into account. The last situation is however 
not as clear-cut and, in my opinion, it brings the question of the appropriate basis of liability 
to a head. This sub-chapter 6.7. will be focusing on this kind of situation, when bringing 
aspects such as general theories on strict liability, channeling and limitation of liability and 
availability of insurance cover into the picture. Furthermore, consideration will be made to 
the RR and their drafting process, which is the most recent attempt to regulate the dangerous 
goods liability within carriage of goods by sea. 
6.7.2. The preventive function of a strict liability in general 
In the Nordic countries, strict liability has developed both through legislation and legal prin-
ciples that have been formulated by case law.164 Strict liability has been imposed in respect 
of e.g. compensation of environmental damage, liability for oil pollution from ships and 
product liability. What is common for most activities covered by a strict liability is that they 
are in some sense considered exceptional, either because they are particularly dangerous or 
                                                          
163 Cf. discussion in sub-chapter 2.1.4.  
164 Pauli Ståhlberg and Juha Karhu, Finsk skadeståndsrätt (Fiducia vol 2, Talentum 2014), 138.  
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because they may lead to extensive damage.165 A strict liability may be justified where a 
fault-based liability, despite the relativity of the standard of care, might not be sufficient to 
control the risks where an activity is dangerous enough.166  
From a legal policy point of view, a strict liability may be justified where the injurer seeks 
economic gains in carrying out the dangerous activity167 and the victim has poor chances of 
avoiding the damage.168 It seems reasonable that the party carrying out a dangerous activity 
shall bear the consequences when the risk materializes. The prevailing polluter pays princi-
ple within environmental law provides an example of this kind of reasoning. The principle 
has been used to justify strict liability for e.g. maritime pollution liability, primarily through 
arguments on economic prevention.169  
However, the justification for imposing a strict liability is more often based on a law and 
economics arguments, and primarily on arguments on economic prevention170. Law and eco-
nomics is a behavioral science which is aimed at understanding how distinct legal interpre-
tations or regulations may influence the behavior of individuals.171 Within the field of tort 
law, the theory on economic prevention is aimed at minimizing the total costs by means of 
tort rules and insurance arrangements.172 When calculating the total costs both the primary 
costs, inter alia costs for the expected damages and prevention costs, and secondary costs, 
such as transaction costs, shall be considered.173  
The primary costs may, simply put, be reduced either by increasing the standard of care 
required or by reducing the level of activity.174 There is a close connection between the basis 
of liability and the amounts of primary costs. As the prevention costs will generally increase 
where the required standard of care becomes more stringent, the optimal level of care must 
be found. A system where the prevention costs exceed the expected damage will not be ef-
ficient. It must also be considered who is the “cheapest cost avoider” when risk is 
                                                          
165 ibid, 139.  
166 Jan Hellner and Marcus Radetzki, Skadeståndsrätt (Nionde upplagan, Norstedts Juridik 2014), 163.  
167 Ståhlberg and Karhu (n 165), 139.  
168 Hellner and Radetzki (n 167), 163.  
169 Björn Sandvik, Miljöskadeansvar: En skadeståndsrättslig studie med särskild hänsyn till ansvarsmotiv, 
miljöskadebegreppet och ersättning för skada på miljön (Åbo akademi 2002), 17.  
170 ibid, 59.  
171 Kalle Määttä, Oikeustaloustieteen aakkoset (Helsingin yliopiston oikeustieteellisen tiedekunnan julkaisut 
[1], Helsingin yliopisto 1999), 12. 
172 Björn Sandvik, ‘Skadeståndsinstitutets preventiva betydelse: Särskilt om strikt ansvar och ekonomisk pre-
vention’ (1999) 86 Retfærd 22, 25.  
173 ibid, 25.  
174 Sandvik, Miljöskadeansvar (n 170), 44.  
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allocated.175 When allocating the risks between the injurer and victim consideration shall be 
made to which party can insure his risks to the lowest costs.176  
It is often maintained that an optimal level of care on both the injurer’s and the victim’s side 
may be attained by a fault-based as well as a strict liability, when combined with the principle 
on contributory negligence.177 However, there is a great difference in that strict liability will 
charge the costs of accidents on the injurers, whereas under negligence they are born by the 
victims.178 The strict liability may however provide an additional cost-controlling instrument 
in comparison to the fault-based liability, namely to influence the level of activity. Where a 
party risks facing a strict liability, he may have incentives to reduce the extent of his busi-
ness. However, a strict liability will be most beneficial in situations where the injurer has 
better opportunities than the victim of affecting the probability and extent of damage.179 
Where a victim may to a larger extent contribute to the damage, a strict liability will not be 
economically effective.180  
Applying the above law and economics theories on the issue of strict liability for damage 
caused by dangerous good in carriage of goods by sea, it may be established that a certain 
degree of care is required by both the contracting shipper and the carrier for the goods to be 
transported safely. The contracting shipper’s care is primarily linked to his obligation to 
provide information on the properties of the goods, but also to pack and mark the goods 
properly. The carrier, on the other hand, must exercise due care in the handling of the goods, 
and in acquainting himself with their special requirements. It is admitted that the contracting 
shipper is generally in a better position to know the special features of the specific cargo, but 
that is not always the case.  
In cases where the dangerous characteristics of the goods are more foreseeable for the con-
tracting shipper, cf. the first situation as outlined in 6.7.1., a strict liability may be justified 
on the basis of the above theories, at least where the carrier has no actual or constructive 
knowledge of the dangerous nature of the goods. In that kind of situation, the carrier will 
have poor chances of avoiding the damage in spite of taking due care, whereas the 
                                                          
175 Hellner and Radetzki (n 167), 53.  
176 ibid, 53.  
177 Sandvik, Miljöskadeansvar (n 170), 45, referring to Steven Shavell, Economic analysis of accident law 
(Harvard University Press 1987), 16.  
178 Frank H Stephen, The economics of the law (First publ. 1988, repr, Harvester Wheatsheaf 1989), 137. 
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contracting shipper may more easily prevent damage from occurring. The contracting ship-
per may also control his risk by reducing the trading with those dangerous substances.  
However, there are instances where the carried goods possess properties that neither the 
contracting shipper nor the carrier could possibly be aware of, cf. situation 3 above. In such 
cases, a strict liability would hardly have any preventive function compared to a fault-based 
liability. Neither will the strict liability provide any incentives to reduce or stop the ship-
ments of such goods, as their dangerous nature is not known. From a legal policy point of 
view, it is not reasonable to impose a strict liability where the liable person has little chances 
of appreciating the dangerous nature of his acts.181 A damage caused by goods, which dan-
gerous characteristics are unknown to the contracting parties, must practically be considered 
an accident. It must thus be decided whether it is more equitable to place the risk for such an 
accident on the contracting shipper (by way of a strict liability rule) or on the carrier (fault-
based liability on side of the contracting shipper). Drawing any conclusions in respect of this 
requires further considerations on the general functions of a strict liability.  
The secondary costs will also have an impact on the efficiency of tort rules. The costs of 
risk-bearing are secondary costs which play an important role in this context: a person’s 
ability to carry risks depends to a large extent on his access to insurance.182 It will be of 
relevance who can insure at the lowest cost.183 The carrier’s and contracting shipper’s access 
to insurance for damage caused by dangerous goods will be further dealt with in sub-chapter 
6.7.3. Furthermore, there are transactional costs to consider.184 Costs for proving the exist-
ence of negligence may advocate for imposing a strict liability.185 However, it shall not be 
disregarded that also strict liability requires demonstration of causality.186  
Another important aspect is that strict liability will allocate the economic resources in the 
most efficient way where the damage is “perfectly compensatory”, meaning that the victim’s 
                                                          
181 Juha Häyhä, ‘Ankara vastuu ja vahingonkorvausoikeiden järjestelmä’ (1999) XXXII Oikeustiede-Jurispru-
dentia 81, 113, 123; Henry B Ussing, ‘Skyld og skade: Bør erstatningspligt udenfor kontraktsforhold være 
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182 Henrik Lando, ‘Tort Law from the Perspective of Economic Theory’ (1997) 110 TfR 919, 923. 
183 ibid, 930. 
184 According to Hellner and Radetzki (n 167), 52, a result of the so-called Coase theorem the transactional 
costs will play an prominent role for the efficiency of the chosen tort rules. Pursuant to the Coase theorem, 
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losses shall be compensated in full.187 Where the injurer is not liable for all damage caused, 
he will not be encouraged to avoid the part of the loss that is not compensable. In the context 
of carriage of dangerous goods by sea, the contracting shipper will have a right of global 
limitation of his liability.188 It is admitted that the limitation amounts are normally extensive 
and may not affect the exercised level of care appreciably. This fact is still one of many 
factors that must be considered in the complex issue of determining the most appropriate 
basis of liability for damage caused by dangerous goods.  
To summarize the above outline of theories of economic prevention, there are a range of 
aspects that must be balanced against each other to derive at some sort of conclusion. There 
appears to be several arguments in favor of applying a fault-based liability for damage caused 
by dangerous goods where the dangerous nature is difficult to predict. However, as Lando 
duly points out, in deciding whether a strict liability is justified, the possibility of using other 
instruments in combination with tort law in order to reduce the total costs must be taken into 
account.189 Public safety regulations may also ensure sufficient prevention190, as the breach 
of these may lead to hefty fines and other penalties. The threat of sanctions may provide an 
important incentive for the contracting shipper to exercise a high level of care.  Before any 
further conclusions as to the appropriateness of the strict liability will be drawn, considera-
tions will be made to the availability of insurance and channeling of liability. 
6.7.3. Insurance aspects 
According to Hellner and Radetzki, the availability of a liability insurance may be a legal 
policy argument in favor of imposing liability on a party.191 By the same token, the lack of 
liability insurance solutions on the market may advocate for a fault-based liability, rather 
than a strict one. In choosing between the two alternatives, considerations shall also be made 
as to who is the “cheapest insurer”, i.e. who can obtain insurance at the lowest cost.192  
The contracting shipper may, depending on the delivery terms of the sales contract, be 
obliged to insure the cargo during carriage. This kind of cargo insurance however only co-
vers damage to the goods and not the contracting shipper’s liability for damage caused by 
                                                          
187 Häyhä (n 182), 135, citing Robert Cooter and Thomas S Ulen, Law and economics (The Addison-Wesley 
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the goods. To my knowledge, there is no ready insurance solution on the market which is 
tailored for the contracting shipper’s dangerous goods liability. The contracting shipper may 
however choose to take out a general liability insurance, which covers liability for personal 
injury and property damage caused in his business. As the name suggests, this is however a 
general insurance, which is not necessarily adapted for the special circumstances of carriage 
of goods by sea. The terms and conditions of the insurance may be subject to exclusions and 
limitations, which may affect the contracting shipper’s rights of compensation for liability 
for third-party damage caused by his goods. The insurance generally excludes liability for 
environmental damage, which means that a separate insurance cover must be arranged for 
that.193 Furthermore, the standard insured amount will most likely be insufficient to cover 
the extensive losses dangerous goods may cause in a worst-case scenario. Even though the 
insured amount is subject to agreement between the parties to the insurance contract, it will 
not be economically feasible to increase the insured amount solely for the purpose of such 
worst-case scenarios. The insurance cover is also as a starting point restricted to liability that 
may arise under general tort rules and contractual liability must be specifically included pur-
suant to an additional premium.194 This will be the case with the contracting shipper’s liabil-
ity to the carrier under NMC 13:41 (§ 291), as it is considered contractual.195  
The carrier however has better opportunities of insuring his risks for damage caused by dan-
gerous goods. In the carriage of dangerous goods, the carrier’s risks will be in the form of 
property damage (to his ship and other property onboard) and liability (for damage and in-
juries caused to third parties). He may cover all of these risks by way of a hull and machinery 
(H&M) and a protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance. The P&I insurances are mainly 
provided by so-called P&I clubs, which are mutual insurance companies. These are founded 
on the idea that insurance shall be offered at cost price. H&M insurance is also to some 
extent provided by mutual companies. However, given the number of insurance providers 
on the market, the insurance premiums for full-scale H&M insurances are generally reason-
able.   
In the light of the foregoing, the appropriateness of placing of a strict liability on the con-
tracting shipper may be further questioned. The allocation of risks between the parties seems 
unreasonable given the fact that there is no truly adequate insurance policy covering the 
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contracting shipper’s liability, whereas the carrier is offered well-adapted solutions to a rea-
sonable cost. This finding is not at all new: already in a discussion on liability for damage 
from goods in 1978 it was concluded that the insurance practices were not sufficiently de-
veloped in comparison to the extensive risks the contracting shipper is carrying.196 After 40 
years, it must be assumed that there is no commercial interest in offering a separate liability 
insurance product covering the contracting shipper’s liability for damage caused by (danger-
ous) goods. It is therefore time to consider other instruments for obtaining a more equitable 
risk allocation between the contracting shipper and carrier. 
6.7.4. Aspects on channeling of liability 
Expanding the perspectives of this study, possibly somewhat outside of the intended scope 
of the thesis, considerations will also be made as to channeling of strict liability.197 These 
considerations may help understanding the position of the contracting shipper within a field 
of law that is characterized by multiple liability systems. Liability for damage caused by 
(dangerous) goods is not governed by a single uniform liability regime which channels lia-
bility to a particular person. There are several parallel liability systems, such as the NMC’s 
provisions on the contracting shipper’s strict liability, the CLC and the HNSC. In addition 
to these, claims may be made pursuant to ordinary tort rules. The liable persons and basis of 
liability are different under these separate regimes. To draw conclusions as to the appropri-
ateness of the contracting shipper’s strict liability under NMC 13:41 (§ 291), it must be 
considered whether the construction of the rule may have implications on the channeling of 
liability in general.  
Under the CLC and HNSC liability is channeled to the registered owner of a ship by placing 
a strict liability on his shoulders. The CLC covers liability for pollution damage caused by 
the escape or discharge of oil carried as cargo on the ship.198 Under the HNSC the registered 
owner is strictly liable for personal injury, damage to property outside the ship and 
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environmental pollution caused by hazardous and noxious cargo.199 The strict liability under 
these conventions is founded on the polluter pays principle.200  
The strict liability rule in NMC 13:41 (§ 291) is not restricted to certain kinds of losses, 
however, it only applies to the relationship between the contracting shipper and the carrier. 
Third-parties will thus have to claim the contracting shipper pursuant to ordinary tort rules. 
On the other hand, the carrier has a right of recourse against the contracting shipper under 
NMC 13:41 (§ 291) for damage which he has compensated to third-parties. It shall however 
be pointed out that, under HNSC, third-parties suffering damage from hazardous and nox-
ious goods will have to resort to claiming the contracting shipper in tort, where the contract-
ing shipper has failed to inform the carrier of the goods’ dangerous nature and the carrier did 
not otherwise know or ought not to know of the nature, as the registered shipowner is then 
exempted from strict liability.201    
There is no full synchronization between the separate liability regimes covering damage 
caused by dangerous goods. The above example shows that a third-party suffering damage 
from hazardous or noxious substances will not be able to invoke strict liability against the 
carrier/registered owner nor the contracting shipper where the contracting shipper has failed 
to fulfill his obligation to inform. This is not an optimal solution if liability is supposed to 
be channeled to the ultimately liable person. I admit that the strict liability rule in NMC 
13:41 (§ 291) is older than the liability regimes of mentioned international conventions, but 
if the idea of channeling liability is to function properly, the separate liability schemes must 
be connected. If the intention would have been that the strict liability for hazardous and 
noxious cargo was to be channeled, by way of recourse actions, to the contracting shipper, 
the particular exemption in HNSC would not have been added. However, I do not think it 
would be an optimal solution either to expand the scope of the contracting shipper’s strict 
liability under NMC 13:41(§ 291) to cover also damage caused to third-parties. In my opin-
ion, an option could be to include the contracting shipper/shipper/cargo owner within the 
group of liable persons under CLC and HNSC, and then let NMC 13:41 (§ 291) govern the 
reciprocal allocation of liability between the carrier and the contracting shipper. However, 
the amendment of international conventions is a complex process and is probably not a via-
ble option in the light of their already advanced compensation and funding structures. The 
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conclusion must be that the appropriate liability basis under NMC 13:41 (§ 291) is an inde-
pendent issue which must be decided without considerations to the channeling of liability.  
6.7.5. The appropriateness of a strict liability in the light of the Rotterdam Rules  
Under Nordic law, the contracting shipper’s liability for damage caused by his dangerous 
goods has practically been the same since the strict liability was introduced in the revision 
of the Nordic maritime codes in the 1930’s. The liability rule has been subject to scrutiny 
and minor revisions during the 20th century, but no genuine attempts have been made to 
abolish the strict basis of liability in the NMC. However, the drafting process of the RR, 
being the most recent international attempt to review the basis of liability, may provide in-
teresting input to the discussion. The RR have not yet entered into force and are unlikely to 
do so within a foreseeable future202. The fact that the first drafts to the convention did not 
contain any special liability regime in respect of dangerous goods, and that a strict liability 
rule was reintroduced later in the drafting process, however may shed some light on the 
appropriateness of the strict liability in modern times.  
The RR were adopted by the UN General Assembly in Rotterdam in December 2008, how-
ever the work within UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) with pre-
paring the convention started already at the beginning of the new millennium.203 The aim of 
the convention is to modernize and harmonize international rules relating to maritime car-
riage of goods by replacing the HR, HVR and Hamburg Rules.204 The contracting ship-
per’s205 dangerous goods liability is set out in article 32, which provides that he shall be 
strictly liable for damage caused by his failure to inform the carrier206 of the dangerous nature 
of the goods or to mark the goods. The strict liability will however not apply in cases where 
the carrier or performing party207 was otherwise aware of the dangerous nature. It shall be 
noted that, pursuant to article 32, it is sufficient that the information is given to the carrier, 
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even where the goods are delivered to a performing party. Goods are considered dangerous 
where they, by their nature or character are, or reasonably appear likely to become, a danger 
to persons, property or the environment.208 The phrase “reasonably appear likely to become” 
was added to include goods that was not dangerous at the time of shipment, but could turn 
dangerous during the voyage.209 The chosen wording however shows that considerations 
were given to the contracting shipper’s chances of predicting the goods’ potential of becom-
ing dangerous at the time of shipment. Despite the attempt to define “dangerous”, it is not 
fully clear how this shall be interpreted. Stevens and Baughen conclude that it probably in-
cludes legally dangerous goods, such as contraband.210 This implies a difference in compar-
ison to the scope of the strict liability rule under the NMC. However, to other parts, the RR 
do not bring about any material changes with regards to the contracting shipper’s strict lia-
bility.211 
The CMI Draft Instrument on Transport Law212 (Draft Instrument), which was an early draft 
to the RR, did not contain any special liability regime in respect of dangerous goods.213 
However, a separate provision on dangerous goods was later reintroduced in the draft con-
vention.214 Pursuant to article 7.6. of the Draft Instrument the contracting shipper’s liability 
to the carrier was based on fault with a reversed burden of proof. In the comments to article 
7.6 CMI justified the proposal by holding that the distinction between dangerous and ordi-
nary goods was out of date and caused interpretational issues given the relativity of the no-
tion “dangerous”.215 The UNCITRAL Working Group on Transport Law (Working Group 
III) took over the drafting work from the CMI in 2001, and during their 13th session in 2004 
                                                          
208 Rotterdam Rules Article 32.  
209 UNCITRAL Working Group on Transport Law, 13th session, ‘A/CN.9/552’ (May 2004), Article 148; UN-
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210 Frank Stevens, ‘Duties of the Shipper and Dangerous Cargoes’ in Thomas D Rhidian (ed), The carriage of 
goods by sea under the Rotterdam rules (Informa Law 2010), 230-231; Simon Baughen, ‘Obligations owed by 
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it was proposed to introduce a special liability rule regarding dangerous goods. In report 
A/CN.9/552 of Working Group III the following was expressed: 
“As to the substance of the proposal under which the shipper should be held strictly liable to inform the 
carrier of the dangerous nature of the goods and of the necessary safety measures, a concern was ex-
pressed that the proposed rule might be unnecessary and its effect uncertain, unpredictable, and overly 
onerous for the shipper, particularly in view of existing case law in a number of countries, under which 
goods, although not identifiable as dangerous before the carriage could later be declared dangerous by 
courts adjudicating the claim, for the sole reason that they had caused damage.”216 
It was further concluded that, should a provision referring to “dangerous goods” be included, 
a definition should be provided.217 The draft presented at the 16th session included a general 
definition of dangerous along the same lines as in the final RR.218 During the session, it was 
proposed that the definition should be tied to existing international instruments on dangerous 
goods, such as the IMDG Code and HNSC, but this was dismissed with reference to that 
these were created for public interest purposes and were very technical in nature.219 What is 
remarkable is that the contracting shipper’s obligation to mark or label the goods in RR 
article 32(b) shall be determined by “any law, regulation or other requirement of public au-
thorities”. 
In the early process of drafting the RR, the special rule on strict liability for dangerous goods 
was thus considered, and found redundant, by the CMI. Working Group III surprisingly eas-
ily concluded that the dangerous goods liability construction of the HVR and the Hamburg 
Rules should be maintained. To me it appears like Working Group III was not ready to let 
go of the old and tested concepts of the HVR and Hamburg Rules, even though concerns had 
been raised as to their unpredictability and onerousness from the contracting shipper’s point 
of view. The proposal to bind the notion of “dangerous goods” to the IMDG Code or the 
HNSC was also dismissed without any profound considerations. Working Group III opted 
for the traditional and tried approach, but I am not fully convinced this is for the best. How-
ever, from a Nordic point of view, the RR bring about interesting modifications as to whom 
the information shall be given to (i.e. the contracting carrier) and emphasis on the contracting 
shipper’s possibilities of predicting the goods’ potential of becoming dangerous during car-
riage.  
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7. A new liability model 
In Chapter 6 the appropriateness of the current liability construction in NMC 13:41 (§ 291) 
was analyzed from several perspectives. The criticism of the liability construction may be 
divided into two groups: one accepting strict liability as the proper basis of liability, and one 
that goes to the roots of the current construction in questioning whether a strict liability is at 
all justified. The question under the latter category may be rephrased in the following way: 
shall there be a special liability regime for dangerous goods?  
The function of the current model, where the contracting shipper’s liability for damage 
caused by dangerous goods is strict, could in my opinion be improved by several modifica-
tions. Firstly, the liability rule must be redrafted with regards to its functionality and alloca-
tion of the burden of proof. It is not ideal to express the preconditions for strict liability in 
the negative. Therefore, the strict liability shall apply where it is proven, by the carrier, that 
the shipped goods were dangerous, but shall be subject to two exceptions, which the con-
tracting shipper may invoke and prove the fulfilment of.220  
The first exception is where the claiming carrier was aware, or was ought to be aware, of the 
dangerous nature of the goods. This means that none of the carriers involved in the carriage 
of the goods can invoke the contracting shipper’s strict liability where he took the goods in 
his charge with knowledge of their dangerous nature.  
Pursuant to the second exception, strict liability shall also be excluded where the contracting 
shipper can prove that contracting carrier was aware, or ought to be aware, of the dangerous 
nature of the goods. This practically means that the contracting shipper shall inform the con-
tracting carrier rather than the receiving carrier. In my view, it is more natural that the con-
tracting shipper shall inform his contracting party. Furthermore, as the contracting shipper 
is not necessarily the shipper of the goods, he and the receiving carrier, who may be a sub-
carrier, may not always have appropriate means of communicating with each other. This 
modification of the obligation to inform is however primarily aimed at ensuring that the 
information on the dangerous nature of the goods is more likely to flow along the whole 
chain of carriers, as the contracting carrier will be obliged to inform his sub-carriers.221 The 
contracting carrier will be considered a contracting shipper in relation to his sub-carriers and 
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will therefore be strictly liable towards them. Sub-carrier situations222 and the channeling of 
the strict liability along the chain of carriers223 are thus taken into consideration. In improv-
ing the flow of information, there are tremendous gains to be made in the prevention of 
damage caused by dangerous goods.224 Dangerous situations are after all often caused by the 
lack of information on the special handling requirements of the goods.225 In this solution, 
there would be no separate precondition regarding the contracting shipper’s failure to in-
form; under the second exception no regard is paid to how the carrier has become aware of 
the dangerous nature.226 Furthermore, the constructive knowledge of the carrier shall also 
trigger the exceptions.227 This will ensure a more equitable distribution of liability between 
the contracting shipper and the carrier, as the carrier will have to fulfill his ordinary duty of 
care also when he is carrying dangerous goods.  
It was established previously that information on the necessary safety measures does not 
have any independent function for the purpose of the strict liability rule.228 Consequently no 
reference is made to that part of the obligation to inform in the proposed modified strict 
liability rule. However, where the failure to inform of necessary safety measures has resulted 
in losses, liability may ensue under the ordinary fault-based liability rule in the current NMC 
13:40 (§ 290).  
With regard to the definition of dangerous goods I have asserted that, in a strict liability 
model, the determination of whether a particular cargo is dangerous or not must be more 
predictable for the contracting shipper.229 The current construction does not expressly state 
that the dangerousness assessment shall be based on what was known at the time of ship-
ment, and there is thus a risk that the courts will be more inclined to will consider the goods 
being dangerous where a severe incident has in fact occurred. From the contracting shipper’s 
point of view this is not reasonable. A very detailed definition however risks becoming too 
rigid and turn obsolete considering the constant emergence of new substances and to some 
physically semi-dangerous goods. The separate interests and aspects must thus be balanced 
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against each other. From the contracting shipper’s perspective, a definition referring to the 
existing international instruments on dangerous goods, such as the IMDG Code and the 
HNSC, would provide the best predictability. However, this definition would be fully de-
pendent on the frequent revisions of these instrument. I would therefore rather propose a 
definition founded on an objective foreseeability assessment230 as the one contained in RR 
article 32. Pursuant to the Rotterdam definition, it is evident that the assessment shall be 
based on what was known on the nature of the goods, and their potential of becoming dan-
gerous, at the time of shipment. The phrase “reasonably appear likely to become” implies 
that the assessment shall be made from the perspective of a prudent contracting shipper, 
rather than on the basis of subjective circumstances on the side of the contracting shipper. I 
see no reasons for restricting the definition of dangerous to physically dangerous goods, but 
it could also comprise semi-dangerous and legally dangerous goods, such as contraband, as 
long as the dangerousness could have been anticipated at the time of shipment. By including 
contraband and goods that may turn dangerous under special circumstances within the scope 
of the strict liability rule, the issues with distinguishing between the categories of dangerous 
goods will be eliminated.231  
The liability model proposed above builds on the presumption that the contracting shipper’s 
liability for dangerous goods shall remain strict. However, the outline in sub-chapter 6.7. 
shows that there are grounds for questioning the strict basis of liability, especially from an 
economic prevention and insurance point of view. A strict liability may serve the purpose of 
providing the contracting shipper with additional incentives to enhance his level of care, 
inter alia in making himself acquainted with the goods he is shipping, and possibly also to 
consider whether to at all trade with dangerous goods. However, the strict liability will not 
have these functions where the contracting shipper has little chances of appreciating the dan-
gerous nature of the goods. I do however believe that the proposed modifications to the cur-
rent liability rule would shift many of these unpredictable situations from the scope of the 
strict liability rule to the fault-based liability rule under NMC 13:40 (§ 290). There are thus 
justifications for maintaining the strict basis of liability, where the scope of the strict liability 
rule is adjusted in the ways suggested above. The contracting shipper’s difficulties in obtain-
ing insurance for his dangerous goods liability remain, but the consequences would be re-
lieved by the fact that he would have better opportunities of controlling the risks and 
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preventing liability from arising. This might also make the contracting shipper’s strict liabil-
ity for dangerous goods more commercially attractive to insure.  
8. Conclusions 
In this thesis, the strict liability of the contracting shipper under the NMC has been analyzed 
from both a de lege lata and de lege ferenda point of view. It has been concluded that the 
current model is not fully satisfactory as it confers an imbalance between the interests of the 
contracting shipper and the carrier. It is therefore time to review the special liability regime 
in respect of dangerous goods. The thesis has however concluded that there are still argu-
ments in favor of maintaining the strict basis of liability, however the rule must take predict-
ability considerations into account when defining “dangerous goods” and ensure that a suf-
ficient level of care is required by the carrier also when dangerous goods are being carried. 
The definition of dangerous goods need no to be tied to the dangerous goods lists included 
in public safety regulation, such as the IMDG Code, however, there is a need to ensure that 
the dangerousness assessment performed by the courts in hindsight, where a damage has 
already occurred, will be based on what was known of the goods at the time of shipment. 
The perspective shall be that of a prudent contracting shipper. In my view, a dangerous goods 
definition being founded on an objective foreseeability from the contracting shipper’s point 
of view is crucial for balancing the interests of the parties to the contract of carriage. Fur-
thermore, the strict liability rule shall take the constructive knowledge of the carrier into 
account, meaning that the contracting shipper will never be strictly liable where it is proven 
that the contracting carrier, or a claiming sub-carrier, was, or ought to be, aware of the dan-
gerous nature of the goods. This means that the carriers must be active in investigating the 
nature of the goods to be carried. Where the contracting carrier possess constructive 
knowledge of the dangerous nature of the goods, the strict liability will be excluded also 
towards later sub-carriers, irrespective of whether they were unaware of the dangerous na-
ture.  
In chapter 7 a new liability model embracing the above aspects was presented. The proposed 
liability model is aimed at ensuring a proper flow of information along the chain of carriers, 
as information is the key to prevent damage caused by dangerous goods.  
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